stating that a court has equitable power to order the sale or abandonment of dilapidated property
How later courts described this case
- stating that a court has equitable power to order the sale or abandonment of dilapidated property
- explaining that MCL 552.401 is a “statutory exception for invading a spouse’s separate assets”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Schuette, J.
(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent in part. I am reluctant to disturb the decision of the trial court with respect to spousal support and I would uphold the trial court’s determination of this issue.
The case Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 ; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), established the framework for appellate review of property settlements and spousal support in a divorce matter. In Sparks , the Michigan Supreme Court held:
*295 The appellate court must first review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. If the findings of fact are upheld, the appellate court must decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. But because we recognize that the dispositional ruling is an exercise of discretion and that appellate courts are often reluctant to reverse such rulings, we hold that the ruling should be affirmed unless the appellate court is left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable. [Id. at 151-152 (citations omitted).]
See also Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich App 641, 644 ; 502 NW2d 691 (1993); Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429 ; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). In this case, a review of the record indicates that the trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.
In addition, the Sparks-Ianitelli framework requires affirmance unless the appellate court is left with the firm conviction that the division is inequitable. Here, the trial court reviewed and balanced the facts and circumstances surrounding a twenty-three-year relationship and a ten-year marriage in crafting a division of marital property and in concluding that there was a need for a fifteen-year spousal support decree. The trial court applied the various factors outlined in Sparks in considering both the spousal support and the division of marital property. Sparks, supra at 159-160 .
Often, although not universally, the design of a division of marital property and the award of spousal support is the result of an intricate and delicate equation that should not be altered without a firm conviction that it was inequitable. I am of the opinion that the trial court’s determination of spousal support is not inequitable under the facts and circumstances of *296 this case. I would affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to spousal support.