“[p]oficies in violation of the insurable interest rule are not dangerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because they are dangerous”
How later courts described this case
- “[p]oficies in violation of the insurable interest rule are not dangerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because they are dangerous”
- "[p]olicies in violation of the insurable interest rule are not dangerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because they are dangerous"
- judgment for $75,000 upheld under Homicide Act on simple negligence charge
- “it has long been recognized by this court and practically all courts in this country that an insured is placed in a position of extreme danger where a policy of insurance is issued on his life in favor of a beneficiary who has no insurable interest”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized by Matthias v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 752 (1968)
267 Ala. 171 [100 So.2d 696, 61 A.L.R.2d 1346]) has been criticized (47 Cal.L.Rev. 64).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Alabama Power Co. v. Laney, 1983 Ala. LEXIS 4030 (1983)
Thus,Weldon is distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Vines v. Plantation Motor Lodge, 1976 Ala. LEXIS 1786 (1976)
Also the rule adopted in Weldon is inapplicable for other reasons given in that opinion.
The opinion
COLEMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the opinion of the majority except the holding that National Life was riot énfitléd'to the affirmative charge.
The opinion states that “National Life was entitled to an affirmative instruction in its favor unless the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Mrs. Dennison knew that the policy had been issued * * * ” and “There is no direct evidence going to show that Mrs. Dennison had knowledge of the fact that the National Life policy had been issued at the time she killed the child.”
A conclusion that Mrs. Dennison had such knowledge must, therefore, rest on a reasonable inference from the matters as to which there was evidence. The majority appear to reason that since she could have had knowledge, the jury is permitted to conclude that she did have knowledge.
As it appears to me, such knowledge on the part of Mrs. Dennison, under all the circumstances of the case, does not follow as a reasonable conclusion from the fact that she did not act until after the policy reached Wetumpka. Such a conclusion, as I see it, rests on speculation or conjecture rather than reasonable inference.
Therefore, in the particular noted, I respectfully dissent.