determining level of knowledge trial court must have regarding specifics of immunity agreement when court dismisses case pursuant to immunity agreement
How later courts described this case
- determining level of knowledge trial court must have regarding specifics of immunity agreement when court dismisses case pursuant to immunity agreement
- stating that the trial court must “approve[] the dismissal that results from an immunity agreement”
- State may offer use and *453 derivative-use immunity if it needs to compel witness testimony, and that immunity agreement must be ratified by trial judge, but "[t]he trial court's role is very limited in this context.”
- State may offer use and derivative-use immunity if it needs to compel witness testimony, and that immunity agreement must be ratified by trial judge, but "[t]he trial court's role is very limited in this context."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
The opinion of the Court cites to Graham v. State, 994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), and again uses the terms “immunity agreement” and “agreement not to prosecute” interchangeably, one of the bases on which I differed with the majority in Graham. See id. at 657-658 (Johnson, J., concurring). I am unable to equate logically “a prosecutorial promise to dismiss a case” (ante at 851), with a prosecu-torial promise not to file at all. However, this case is unlike Graham , in that criminal charges were filed and then dismissed with the approval of a judge and that both sides agreed at that time that there was an immunity agreement. I agree that once criminal charges are filed, whether by information or indictment, the approval of a judge is needed to dismiss them. I continue to believe that, until charges are filed, a dismissal of a complaint or a decision not to file formal charges rests within the sound discretion of the prosecutor and need not be ratified by a judge. With these comments, I join the opinion of the Court.