noting Arkansas officers and employees have immunity similar to federal qualified immunity for non-malicious acts or omissions within the scope of their employment
How later courts described this case
- noting Arkansas officers and employees have immunity similar to federal qualified immunity for non-malicious acts or omissions within the scope of their employment
- upholding the death penalty where the defendant shot two men, strangled the mother of one of the men, and buried all three victims alive and the jury found four aggravating circumstances, including prior violent felony, heinous, atrocious, or cruel, felony murder, and mass murder
- stating that the party asserting qualified immunity bears burden of proving they are entitled to qualified immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I have a hard tiholding, ce, majority does, that police officers of reasonable competence would disagree on the issue of whether riding horseback while intoxicated constitutes driving while intoxicated. Clearly, riding horseback is not driving a motor vehicle. Nevertheless, by her arrest, Trooper Cordes did remove a person who had been drinking and who was on Highway 62 from that highway. This was certainly in the public interest. For that reason, I conclude that in arresting Jeffrey Baldridge, she was not plainly incompetent.
The United States Supreme Court has set the federal standard for qualified immunity:
As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. At common law, in cases where probable cause to arrest was lacking, a complaining witness’ immunity turned on the issue of malice, which was a jury question. Under the Harlow [Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)] standard, on the other hand, an allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner. The Harlow standard is specifically designed to “avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,” and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal. Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). I am more comfortable in this case using the test of “plainly incompetent” rather than “objective reasonableness.”
Having concluded that Trooper Cordes is entitled to qualified immunity for the federal claim, I question the majority’s analysis of the state civil rights claim. The pertinent state statute granting qualified immunity under state law reads:
(a) Officers and employees of the State of Arkansas are immune from liability and from suit, except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance, for damages for acts or omissions, other than malicious acts or omissions, occurring within the course and scope of their employment.
Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-305 (a) (Supp. 1999). We do not know from the majority opinion whether Trooper Cordes was covered by liability insurance and, if not, whether Baldridge alleged malice on the part of the trooper in his complaint. My reading of Baldridge’s complaint is that malice was not alleged. Because of this, I conclude that Trooper Cordes is also entitled to qualified immunity for the state claim.
I concur in the result reached by the majority.
Corbin and Thornton, JJ., join.