The opinion
John Mauzy Pittman, Judge, dissenting. I dissent. This case should be reversed because the Commission’s opinion is premised on facts not in evidence and is not supported by substantial evidence.
The appellant was already suffering from a nonwork-related, preexisting degenerative disc disease when he sustained a compen-sable back injury in 1983. 1 He is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his compensable injury, but he has not been hospitalized for any back problems since 1993. Appellant is now sixty-four years old.
The current appeal involves a claim for additional medical benefits in the form of an IDET procedure to treat annular tears that arose subsequent to appellant’s compensable injury. The issue at the hearing was whether this procedure was reasonably necessary treatment for appellant’s compensable injury, as opposed to his preexisting back condition. The Commission decided that the IDET procedure was reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensa-ble injury. It expressly based this finding on the testimony of appellant’s psychiatrist, Dr. Remmel. The Commission stated:
Dr. Remmel assessed the claimant’s increase [d] complaint relative to his low back as a progression of his prior injury. [Emphasis added.]
There are two problems with this finding. First, it is not factually correct. Dr. Remmel did not say that appellant’s increased symptoms were in any way the result of his injury. Instead, Dr. Remmel said only that appellant’s problem was most likely “a progression of the disease process.” (Emphasis added.) The disparity between Dr. Remmel’s undisputed actual statement and the Commission’s finding regarding that statement is alone enough to require reversal. Administrative decisions may only be affirmed on the agency’s findings and for the reason stated by the agency, even where there is evidence in the record that would support the agency’s determination on a different basis. See generally Al-Co Properties, Inc. v. Department of State, 88 A.D.2d 88 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 947 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Consequently, our function in reviewing workers’ compensation cases is limited to determining whether the Commission’s findings as to the existence or nonexistence of essential facts are or are not supported by the evidence. See Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489 , 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979); Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18 , 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986). Simply put, we do not make our own findings of fact in workers’ compensation cases, or affirm on the ground that the Commission reached the right result for the wrong reason. See Cook v. Alcoa, 35 Ark. App. 16 , 811 S.W.2d 329 (1991). Instead, we simply decide whether the facts found by the Commission are supported by the evidence, and whether those facts support the Commission’s decision. Here, the facts found by the Commission regarding Dr. Remmel’s statement are not supported by the evidence.
Second, Dr. Remmel’s actual statement does not support an award of benefits. Appellant was required to show that the treatment was reasonably necessary for his compensable injury, as opposed to his preexisting back disease. Dr. Remmel’s statement that appellant’s current condition is a progression of the disease process, without identifying what he meant by “disease,” does nothing to resolve this crucial question. It is instructive to compare the situation presented in the present case to that in Tuberville v. International Paper Co., 28 Ark. App. 196 , 771 S.W.2d 805 (1989), aff'd, International Paper Co. v. Tuberville, 302 Ark. 22 , 786 S.W.2d 830 (1990), which the Commission cited. In Tuberville, there was extensive and definite medical testimony to show that Mr. Tuberville’s present condition was causally related to his compensable injury. This record in the present case contains no substantial evidence to support the existence of the necessary causal connection.
In the absence of such evidence, the majority can only arrive at its result by giving appellant the benefit of the doubt with respect to the question of causation. This is patently wrong. It is true that, at the time appellant sustained his compensable injury in 1983, the Commission did give the benefit of the doubt to claimants in making factual determinations. See Brower Manufacturing Co. v. Willis, 252 Ark. 755 , 480 S.W.2d 950 (1972). However, this practice was eliminated by Act 10 of 1986, § 10, which provided that, “[i]n determining whether a party has met the burden of proof on an issue, administrative law judges and the Commission must weigh the evidence impartially and without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party.” 2 This rule is applied retroactively to any case heard by an administrative, law judge or the Commission after the effective date of the Act in June 1986, regardless of the date of the claimant’s injury. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh’s, 298 Ark. 363 , 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989); see also Marrable v. Southern LP Gas, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 1 , 751 S.W.2d 15 (1988); Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196 , 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987). The claim in this case was heard in 2001 and 2002, and appellant was therefore not entitled to the benefit of the doubt in this factual determination, even had it been properly made by the Commission instead of by this court.
The Commission erred in finding that Dr. Remmel attributed appellant’s current condition to his compensable injury, and erred in basing its award of medical benefits on Dr. Remmel’s opinion. We should reverse on that basis, and not compound the error by improperly making our own findings of fact and improperly giving appellant the benefit of the doubt in doing so.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion mentions a “previous compensable injury that was asymptomatic before the October 3, 1983, injury was sustained.” This is incorrect. Appellant sustained only one compensable injury, and sustained it in 1983. It is undisputed that his prior back condition was not work-related.
Identical language was included in Act 796 of 1993 and is now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (c)(4) (Supp. 2002).