holding that article 37.07, § 3(a)(1), is the law "applicable to the case” and thus the trial judge must sua sponte give an instruction on the burden of proof concerning extraneous offenses offered at the punishment stage of a non-capital trial
How later courts described this case
- holding that article 37.07, § 3(a)(1), is the law "applicable to the case” and thus the trial judge must sua sponte give an instruction on the burden of proof concerning extraneous offenses offered at the punishment stage of a non-capital trial
- holding that a trial judge must sua sponte instruct the jury at the punishment phase about article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the State must prove any extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt
- holding that there is a statutory requirement that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that extraneous offenses and bad acts are attributable to the defendant before the jury can consider them in assessing punishment
- holding that, during punishment phase of non-capital cases, trial court is statutorily required, but not constitutionally required, sua sponte, to instruct jury on burden of proof for extraneous offenses or bad acts
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Alejandro Rodriguez Mata v. State (2008)
Huizar is distinguishable
Distinguished by Oscar Lee Burks v. State (2006)
In Rayme v. State, this Court distinguished both Huizar and Graves and held
The opinion
MANSFIELD, Justice,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the majority, reversing the judgment of the court of appeals and remanding this cause for analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (opinion on reh’g).
I would additionally order the court of appeals to determine whether the failure of trial counsel to ask for the instruction as to the State’s burden of proof as to extraneous offenses introduced at the punishment phase of appellant’s trial amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel 1 to the extent that appellant is entitled to a new punishment hearing.
. The standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), apply to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel whether at the guilt/innocence phase or the punishment phase of trial. See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).