holding that although the victim’s initial statements were non-testimonial, the victim’s later statements to the police and her neighbor were testimonial because the primary purpose of the questioning was investigatory, there was no indication of a continuing danger, and the statements “recounted how [the] potentially criminal past events began and progressed”
How later courts described this case
- holding that although the victim’s initial statements were non-testimonial, the victim’s later statements to the police and her neighbor were testimonial because the primary purpose of the questioning was investigatory, there was no indication of a continuing danger, and the statements “recounted how [the] potentially criminal past events began and progressed”
- holding that admission of evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause is not a structural error
- 911 call made by neighbor after victim escaped from defendant, who had been beating her all night, and fled to neighbor’s home was not testimonial
- the fact that the victim was still visibly distressed was not dispositive
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COOPER, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority’s conclusion and scholarly analysis under Davis and Hammon 1 However, because I disagree as to the application in part IV of Carines to this matter, I write separately to address that issue.
The majority concludes that “[b]ecause defendant failed to preserve his Confrontation Clause claim, we review the error under the standard for unpreserved constitutional error.” Ante at 65, citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). I would *68 read Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 ; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), to automatically preserve Confrontation Clause claims. In Crawford , the defendant properly objected at trial to the admission of certain statements as hearsay. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, turned the analysis to the Confrontation Clause, although the defendant had not preserved any such constitutional claim. I would find that Crawford sets the value of the Confrontation Clause guarantee high enough that violations of it cannot be unpre-served error.
Given the importance placed on the Confrontation Clause by Justice Scalia in Crawford , I am concerned that harmless error review is inappropriate. However, the Court did not directly speak to the applicable standard of review in Crawford or Davis, and we must therefore rely on existing Supreme Court precedent addressing the varied standards of review for constitutional errors. Here, because this error is not structural, but rather is “trial error,” in that it “occurred during presentation of the case to the jury,” we are bound to review it following the harmless error standard. Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 306-307 ; 111 S Ct 1246 ; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991). See also Washington v Re-cuenco, _US_; 126 S Ct 2546, 2551 ; 165 L Ed 2d 466 (2006); United States v Gonzalez-Lopez,_US_; 126 S Ct 2557, 2564 ; 165 L Ed 2d 409 (2006). I believe this is an issue the Supreme Court ought to address further; there is an apparent gap between the importance of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford and its consignment to harmless error review by the division between structural error and trial error.
However, in the instant case I agree with the majority; under any analysis, this error was not harmless.
Davis v Washington,_US_; 126 S Ct 2266 ; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006), which includes the companion case of Hammon v Indiana.