Opinion

Ex Parte Russell

  • 31 So. 3d 694
  • 2009 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 35
  • 2009 WL 281160
Court
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Filed
Feb 6, 2009
Status
Published
Author
Thompson
On the bench
Thomas, Moore, Thompson, Pittman
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.6%

actions seeking a declaratory judgment or actions seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law are not subject to sovereign immunity

How later courts described this case

  • actions seeking a declaratory judgment or actions seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law are not subject to sovereign immunity

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the main opinion except insofar as it denies Russell’s petition with regard to Myers’s constitutional claim. In that claim, Myers sought a declaration

“that the current method of valuation as described above upon which Plaintiff and members of the class have been, and are to be, assessed tax liability is in violation of the law and therefore illegal, that it violates both State and Federal Constitutions as it constitutes unequal valuation and violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States.”

With regard to this claim, Myers contends that her claim falls within the second exception to sovereign immunity; in other words, she contends her claim was “ ‘brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law.’ ” Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002) (quoting Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229-30 , 250 So.2d 677, 679 (1971)).

Our supreme court has explained that when an action or claim seeks only “to construe the law and direct the parties, whether individuals or State officers, what it requires of them under a given state of facts,” it falls within declaratory-judgment exception to sovereign immunity. Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 242 Ala. 379, 381 , 6 So.2d 479, 480-81 (1942). Myers does not allege that the relevant statutes concerning the valuation of property for ad valorem tax purposes are unconstitutional. Rather, she seeks a declaration that her constitutional rights were violated by the method of valuation used by Russell and the DOR. That claim does not seek to interpret the law and direct the parties with regard to how to follow a proper interpretation of the law. The claim is not within the exception to sovereign immunity allowed for claims seeking “ ‘to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law.’ ” Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d at 142 . Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Myers may not maintain her constitutional claim. I believe that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss that part of Myers’s complaint asserting her claim seeking a determination that her constitutional rights were violated by the purportedly incorrect interpretation of the valuation statutes. Accordingly, I dissent from that part of the main opinion denying Russell’s petition for-the writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the constitutional claim.

PITTMAN, J., concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.