The opinion
*997 Becker, J.
I dissent as to defendants Timmer, Armstrong and Hopkins.
The basis of disagreement is contained in the following findings of the trial court with which I agree.
“Defendants Timmer, Armstrong, and Hopkins were officers of the corporation and exercised, according to their own testimony, a supervisory role with respect to defendant Pirkl’s activities. Indeed, in the transaction with Mrs. Greathouse, when some complaint arose defendant Timmer accompanied defendant Pirkl on a second visit to Mrs. Greathouse in which a generous gesture of refund was made to this elderly woman and then the 'plan’ was promptly resold to her by defendants Pirkl and Timmer acting together. All that has been said before about the original sale applies equally to this one. Neither of the defendants in the second transaction in any way complied with the provisions of the temporary injunction which have been specifically quoted above, and the total effect of such failure to comply with those provisions amounted to misrepresentation, concealment, and omission of material facts in further violation of the provisions of the temporary injunction. * # *
“Defendants Armstrong and Hopkins are equally guilty of contempt as participants in the preparation of the entire scheme, as corporate officers responsible for the supervision of defendant Pirkl, and, most importantly, as coconspirators with defendants Timmer and Pirkl in a calculated scheme of fraud and false pretense.”
The record clearly shows participation in the profits from Pirkl’s venture. As to Timmer it shows participation in the venture. It shows knowledge that plaintiffs’ agents were still selling this plan after the initial injunction but it is wholly silent on any effective effort to instruct the agents of the corporation as to their duties under the injunction.
“So corporate officers are punishable for contempt where they have knowledge or notice of a writ or order directed to the corporation and they are responsible for the corporation’s violation thereof, as where they fail to take action within their power to secure compliance by the corporation, or where they, *998 by their acts or conduct, prevent the corporation from complying.” 17 C. J. S., Contempt, section 34, page 95.
This is the crux of the matter. There was adequate circumstantial evidence for a finding of contempt in the absence of explanation by the participants. Though they all testified, no explanation was offered. I would affirm as to all plaintiffs and annul the writ.
Larson and Snell, JJ., join in this dissent.