stating that the factors for the trial court to consider, commonly known as the Barker factors, used in analyzing a speedy-trial violation are (1) “whether delay before trial was uncommonly long”; (2) “whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay”; (3) “whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial”; and (4) “whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the factors for the trial court to consider, commonly known as the Barker factors, used in analyzing a speedy-trial violation are (1) “whether delay before trial was uncommonly long”; (2) “whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay”; (3) “whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial”; and (4) “whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result”
- stating that a “deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government,” while a “more neutral reason . . . should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant”
- concluding that the prejudice factor weighed in favor of the defendant where the defendant, a day laborer, had missed at least eleven days of work due to court appearances, had lost wages, and had checked in weekly with his bail bondsman late at night after work every Tuesday for four years while his case was reset multiple times
- finding that, in simple DWI case, defense counsel’s single announcement of "not ready,” seeking a delay of three days to file pretrial motions and obtain the State’s witness list, did not make appellant responsible for the preceding delay of approximately eight months and the subsequent delay of approximately three years
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J., joined.
What does the Court’s opinion say? It may say either, or both, of two things.
The first, and I hope only, thing the Court says today is that, as a matter of law, the State cannot justify years of delay in trying a case by saying that a prosecutor and a court in Bexar County couldn’t, or wouldn’t, interpret words spoken in Spanish on a videotape. While such a justification may be disappointing and surprising, I would not say it necessarily amounts to a constitutional violation.
The other thing the Court might be understood to say is that a defendant can make out a constitutional violation if the only detriment he can show is that he was worried about the pending charge. If that is enough to amount to a constitutional violation, then delays 'per se will be constitutional violations if they were not occasioned by the defendant.
Surely the adage I learned in law school is still true: “Never tried, never convicted.” That is, delay normally helps the defendant. (After law school, I learned an important qualification: the adage applies only if the defendant is on bail. If the defendant is in jail awaiting trial, punishment has effectively started without a conviction.)
*658 The appellant was on bail. He sought a delay, and got one for three months, when the court accepted his announcement of “not ready.” This suggests that his concern about a speedy trial did not mature until he thought he had a colorable claim for dismissal. It is almost judicially noticeable that a speedy trial is the last thing most speedy-trial movants want, if they are admitted to bail.
The harm to the public of having someone who drinks and drives (which I understand to be an unquestioned fact) on bail for four years might be more grave than any harm that the appellant alleged.
I agree with much of the Presiding Judge’s opinion, ante. I respectfully dissent.