holding that Commissioner of Education's responsibility to "promote efficiency and improvement" did not mean that Commissioner could conduct a de novo review of county commissioners' detachment and annexation decisions
How later courts described this case
- holding that Commissioner of Education's responsibility to "promote efficiency and improvement" did not mean that Commissioner could conduct a de novo review of county commissioners' detachment and annexation decisions
- holding statute granting state education commissioner authority to “promot[e] efficiency and improvement in the public school system” did not impliedly grant commissioner authority to detach territory from one school district and annex it to another
- comparing “true trial de novo,” which is not an “appeal” but is a new proceeding to “substantial evidence de novo” review, which is an appeal that gives deference to local board’s findings and decision
- instructing that trial court can conduct evidentiary hearing for purpose of determining fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion in addition to conducting substantial evidence review
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I would hold that the Commissioner of Education may exercise trial de novo review in this appeal taken under TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.13(a).
It is clear under Texas law that the substantial evidence rule does not apply in appeals taken from one administrative agency to another. Lorena I.S.D. v. Rosenthal Com. Sch. Dist., 421 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1967 writ ref'd n.r.e.) and authorities cited. See also, Temple I.S.D. v. State Board of Education, 493 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin, 1973 no writ). The court in Canutillo I.S.D. v. Anthony I.S.D., 442 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) based its erroneous holding to the contrary on a line of cases in which appeal from the county officials’ decision was taken directly to the district court. In such a situation the doctrine of separation of powers mandates that the district court only review the county officials' determination for fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, essentially a substantial evidence type of review. The separation of powers rationale for such a requirement is not applicable to review of one agency’s decision by another. If the Legislature had intended the Commission’s delegated review power to be limited it could have provided for such as it has done in cases of appeals by teachers or students under TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.13. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.207(a) and 11.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
Respondents argue that if trial de novo review is within the discretion delegated to the Commissioner by the Legislature such delegation is unconstitutionally vague as it fails to set out standards by which it must exercise its discretion. Arguably property interests sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of the Legislature’s delegation of authority are not raised by this appeal. However, the Legislature’s delegation of discretion to the administrative agencies here is not unconstitutionally vague.
After delegating detachment and annexation authority to the county officials the Legislature provided for review of those *563 decisions by the Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Education knowing that the Commissioner was delegated with the responsibility “for promoting efficiency and improvement in the public school system of the state and shall have the powers necessary to carry out the duties and responsibilities placed upon him by the Legislature [review under Tex. Educ. Code § 11.13.] and the State Board of Education.” TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.52(b). This is no more vague than a similar standard guiding the State Board of Insurance and held constitutional by this court in Jordan v. State Board of Ins., 334 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.1960).
Thus, I would hold that the Commissioner and the State Board of Education properly exercised their discretion in overturning the county officials’ decision, and having reviewed the record before the State Board of Education, I find that their decision to uphold the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence. For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
HILL, C.J., and SPEARS and MAUZY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.