finding no error when trial court overruled relevancy objection “pending the fact that” the prosecutor would introduce evidence sufficient to fulfill a condition of fact; “Clearly, the parties must be allowed to develop their cases one step at a time.”
How later courts described this case
- finding no error when trial court overruled relevancy objection “pending the fact that” the prosecutor would introduce evidence sufficient to fulfill a condition of fact; “Clearly, the parties must be allowed to develop their cases one step at a time.”
- finding inquiry is whether photographs so horrifying or appalling that juror of normal sensitivity would necessarily encounter difficulty rationally deciding critical issues of case after viewing the photographs
- holding that under rule 104(b), evidence should not be excluded merely because its relevance may depend upon the production of additional evidence at a later point in the trial
- holding that defendant did not have standing under art. 38.23 to object to admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from another person
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Castillo v. State, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 124 (1995)
829 S.W.2d 191, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529
Overruled on other grounds by Riley v. State, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 147 (1994)
829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290, 301
Overruled by State v. Daugherty, 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 88 (1996)
Neither of our Johnson cases nor Daugherty overruled Fuller even though a dissenting opinion in our most recent Johnson case noted the inconsistent approaches taken by this Johnson case and Fuller in interpreting Article 38.23(a).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Murphy v. State, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 118 (2003)
A plurality of the Court disagreed, holding that Fuller controlled and Garrett was distinguishable.
Distinguished by Sadler v. State, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (1998)
Fuller is inapposite.
Distinguished by Rachal v. State, 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 7 (1996)
For the reasons explained below, we disagree with appellant and hold that Fuller and Garrett are distinguishable and that Fuller is controlling.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissents with note:
Dissents generally and particularly to disposition of point four for the reason that under the “plain language rule” an accused is entitled to complain that evidence ob *211 tained illegally “shall (not) be admitted in evidence against (him).” Article 38.23(a), V.A.C.C.P.