Baker v. Bindner

DISSENTING OPINION

BROOKS, District Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent as, under the circumstances of this case, I cannot read Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1116 , 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) as compelling the abandonment of the doctrine of abstention. Here, after a full evidentiary hearing (a hearing was not held in Dombrowski) the plaintiffs’ proof has completely failed to establish any of the factual allegations of their complaint and amended complaint upon which they relied for invoking the jurisdiction of this court. They failed to prove a conspiracy by the defendants to “deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.” They failed to establish that the arrest and prosecutions of the plaintiffs were “fraudulently contrived”, have been carried on in bad faith and “are being maintained without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage these protests and to support racial discrimination in housing in Louisville.” They failed to establish that there was an unconstitutional use of an otherwise constitutional statute or ordinance and they failed to establish that “these prosecutions have had and continue to have a chilling effect upon civil right advocacy in Louisville, Kentucky.” Not only did the plaintiffs fail to prevail on all of these issues, but the evidence affirmatively established that the activities of the defendant law enforcement officials were conducted with impartiality, with commendable restraint and solely in the public interest of maintaining law and order.

It is all these factors that distinguishes this case from Dombrowski and as the Supreme Court cautions in that case “ * * * federal interference with a State’s good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework.” Therefore, the fact that these statutes and ordinances under attack may be subject to serious constitutional infirmities should not of itself permit federal interference with a state’s good-faith administration of its criminal laws. Surely Dombrowski is not a mandate requiring the federal courts, when jurisdiction exists, to pass upon the constitutionality of all the criminal laws of a state that may be subject to challenge. Wells v. Hand, 238 F.Supp. 779 (M.D.Ga.1965), affirmed sub nom Wells v. Reynolds, 382 U.S. 39 , 86 S.Ct. 160 , 15 L.Ed.2d 32 (1965); Brooks v. Briley, Mayor, 274 F.Supp. 538 (M.D.Tenn.1967) decided October 9, 1967 and cases cited therein.

Moreover, the plaintiffs have failed to support their conclusion of irreparable injury based on the allegation that “a substantial loss of federal rights will occur if plaintiffs and the class they represent must await the state court’s disposition and ultimate review in the Supreme Court of the United States of these multiplieitous (sic) prosecutions.” The Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act, KRS Chapter 418, provides expeditious procedure by which the constitutionality *666 of the challenged statutes and ordinances can be determined without invoking federal jurisdiction. See Cassidy v. City of Bowling Green, 368 S.W.2d 318 (1963 Ky.); Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11 , 215 S.W.2d 557 (1948); City of Harrodsburg v. Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky, 278 Ky. 10 , 128 S.W.2d 233 (1939).

Over the years the Supreme Court has consistently followed the doctrine of abstention in attacks on state laws. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 , 79 S.Ct. 1025 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 , 79 S.Ct. 1034 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1959); Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 , 70 S.Ct. 640 , 94 L.Ed. 877 (1950); Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877 , 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943); City of Chicago v. Fielderest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 , 62 S.Ct. 986 , 86 L.Ed. 1355 (1942); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company, 312 U.S. 496 , 61 S. Ct. 643 , 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). I would follow it here.