reasoning that "when the evidence is in 'fair equipoise' (meaning that a rational juror could either find for or against a proposition), any one of the [three rational] conclusions [found by the jury] should be upheld by a reviewing court" and, thus, concluding that the evidence is factually sufficient
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that "when the evidence is in 'fair equipoise' (meaning that a rational juror could either find for or against a proposition), any one of the [three rational] conclusions [found by the jury] should be upheld by a reviewing court" and, thus, concluding that the evidence is factually sufficient
- stating 8 … Fernandez’s house was only about ten miles from Castillo’s parents’ house, where she was staying. 12 that it “is a jury, not a reviewing court, that accepts or rejects reasonably equal competing theories”
- reasoning that an eyewitness could testify he was “pretty sure” the defendant dropped a baggie of cocaine, but it “could have been [a] paper napkin,” and this would be legally sufficient to support a conviction
- attempting to follow Justice Calvert's five-zone analysis of factual insufficiency in civil cases and stating that, only when the evidentiary scales tip "radically" toward a negative finding on an essential element may the reviewing court exercise any "thirteenth juror" role and conclude that the jury's verdict is "clearly wrong"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HERVEY, J.,
filed a concurring opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and KEASLER, J., joined.
I join the Court’s opinion and Presiding Judge Keller’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the Court of Appeals did not afford the jury’s verdict the “due deference” required by our decision in Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Cr.App. *301 2000). There this Court explained that in applying the factual sufficiency standard of review an appellate court “is not empowered with the right to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder’s” on credibility and weight determinations. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12 , and at 7 (factual sufficiency review should not substantially intrude upon the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony), and at 8 (factual sufficiency review “can consider only those few matters bearing on credibility that can be fully determined from a cold appellate record”), and at 9 (“due deference” must be accorded the fact finder’s determinations “particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence”). The resolution of the material issues at appellant’s trial involved the jury’s credibility and weight determinations to which the Court of Appeals should have afforded “due deference.”