concluding that "[s]ince the [l]egislature added a section [in 1999] providing for special procedures where immediate release is anticipated, and amended section 394.915[, Florida Statutes,] to state that the person 'remain in custody' rather than be 'taken into custody,' there is no longer any statutory basis on which to hold that there is no 'in custody' requirement in the Jimmy Ryce Act" despite the fact that "the title of section 394.915 remained the same, and includes the reference to 'respondent taken into custody' "
How later courts described this case
- concluding that "[s]ince the [l]egislature added a section [in 1999] providing for special procedures where immediate release is anticipated, and amended section 394.915[, Florida Statutes,] to state that the person 'remain in custody' rather than be 'taken into custody,' there is no longer any statutory basis on which to hold that there is no 'in custody' requirement in the Jimmy Ryce Act" despite the fact that "the title of section 394.915 remained the same, and includes the reference to 'respondent taken into custody' "
- holding that “an individual must be in lawful custody when the State takes steps to initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition”
- concluding that “the legislative intent of the Jimmy Ryce Act is that the person is in lawful custody at the time any initial steps are taken in the commitment process under either section 394.913 or 394.9135”
- noting that “[related statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and ... [w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 199 (Fla.2007))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WELLS, J.,
dissenting.
I would approve the well-reasoned decision of the First District Court of Appeal in this case, which I conclude correctly applied the statute as intended by the Legislature.