The opinion
PEDEN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result.
“The Supreme Court has had many occasions to emphasize the importance of the distinction between a proceeding in civil contempt and one in criminal contempt. Proceedings in civil contempt are between the original parties and are instituted and tried as a part of the main cause. Though such proceedings are ‘nominally those of contempt,’ the real purpose of the court order is purely remedial — to coerce obedience to a decree passed in complainant’s favor, or to compensate complainant for loss caused by respondent’s disobedience of such a decree.
“The respondent is entitled to due notice of the nature of the proceeding against him — whether of criminal or civil contempt. If respondent is answering a charge of criminal contempt, he ‘is presumed to be innocent, he must be proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to testify against himself.’ ” (citations omitted) Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1946), 163 A.L.R. 379 .
Where the contempt proceeding is considered to be civil in nature, a constitutional provision declaring that a person is not to be compelled to testify against himself has been held not to apply. 17 Am.Jur.2d 36, Contempt § 32.
Under the usual notice given to a respondent in Texas contempt cases and under the provisions of Article 1911a, the trial judge may issue, after a hearing, either a punitive or a coercive order, or both. It appears that most of the questions asked the re *844 spondent in this case concerned his ability to comply with the court’s earlier order. The others did not inquire into any criminal act, so by answering them the relator would only have subjected himself to punishment by a punitive order in the contempt matter then on trial. I agree with the majority’s statement that had the trial judge granted the relator immunity from a punitive order a different question would be presented.