The opinion
J. Seaborn Holt, J., dissenting. In reaching the conclusion that the decree, from which comes this appeal, should be affirmed, I do so because of the plain and unambiguous terms contained in the Deed of Trust in question here and executed by Governor and Mrs. Donaghey July 1, 1929.
As has been pointed out, by the terms of this Deed, certain Trustees were named to administer the trust, which was made a self-perpetuating body. Under this Trust Deed, Governor and Mrs. Donaghey transferred certain income producing property in Little Rock to the Trustees. The Trust Deed recites:
“It is the object and purpose of this deed to convey the property herein described to said Trustees, their successors and assigns for the purpose of creating a fund or foundation to be used for the sole and exclusive benefit of the present Little Rock Junior College, an institution of learning in said city, * * * investing said Trustees with full discretion to select some other public school or schools in said city, operated by or under the management or supervision of the Board of School Directors of the said Special School District of Little Rock, and their successors in charge of the public schools in the said City of Little Rock, in the event the present Little Rock Junior College or its successors, should at any time cease to be operated by or under the' supervision of the public school authorities in said city.
“Said Trustees, their successors or assigns, shall have the sole and exclusive management, control and direction of said property, * * * and manage said properties as an individual could do, said Trustees or their successors to be guided and limited only by the exercise of their best judgment in the interest of the fund and foundation and its objects and purposes.”
How plainer and more understandable language could have been used has not been pointed out by appellants.
“In the administration of a trust, the discovered intent of the trustor is of controlling importance, and the trust is- to be administered in the manner laid down by him.' Neither the court nor the beneficiary or the legislature is competent to violate such intent and to substitute its discretion for that of the trustor.” 54 Am. Jur., % 274, p. 218.
“The intention of the settlor which determines the terms of the trust is his intention at the time of the creation of the trust, and not his subsequent intention.” Restatement of the Law of Trusts, % 4 A, page 16.
‘ ‘ The true rule is that the construction never begins until uncertainty of sense is pretty clearly apparent.” Murphy v. Morris, Executor, 200 Ark. 932 , 141 S. W. 2d 518 .
“Where there is no ambiguity in an instrument transferring property in trust, extrinsic evidence of grantor’s intent is not admissible.” Brewer v. Hassett, 49 Fed., Supp. 501, (Headnote 5).
Thus it plainly appears that the property in question was transferred to the Trustees for the sole benefit of Little Rock Junior College, giving the Board of Trustees the “full discretion” to administer the Trust in the same manner as if it were their own property.
In my view, these Trustees have fully and faithfully complied with the plain directives in the Trust Deed, and I would affirm the decree.