amount of marijuana must be capable of being applied to common usage; conclusion consistent with holding in Greer, supra; “harsh rule, indeed that would charge appellant with knowingly possessing that which it required a microscope to identify
How later courts described this case
- amount of marijuana must be capable of being applied to common usage; conclusion consistent with holding in Greer, supra; “harsh rule, indeed that would charge appellant with knowingly possessing that which it required a microscope to identify
- unusable amount of marihuana not within meaning of possession statute
- marijuana visible only under microscope
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOODLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
The court submitted the ease to the jury as one of circumstantial evidence, defined the term possession as stated in the majority opinion, and instructed the jury to acquit unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did knowingly have in his possession marijuana.
These instructions were evidently in accord with the view of appellant’s counsel as they were given to meet his objection.
I do not agree with my brethren that appellant’s guilt was made to depend alone upon marijuana found in the scrapings from his pocket. To the contrary, it is not likely that a charge on circumstantial evidence would have been requested or given if the evidence showed only that appellant had marijuana in his pocket. As to that marijuana, the evidence was direct, not circumstantial.
In addition to these scrapings from the pocket of the driver *230 of the automobile pursued by the officers, enough marijuana was found on the rear seat to make a cigarette, and the jury was warranted in believing that even this was but the remnant after other marijuana was thrown from the car and scattered to the four winds by appellant’s companions on the rear seat after they “looked back” ht the pursuing car with its spot light trained on them and its red light flashing.
The evidence fully sustains a finding that appellant was fleeing from the officers while his companions were disposing of the contraband and the papers in which it was wrapped, and that he was in possession of marijuana in addition to that found in his pocket.
Whether or not the parties on the back seat also possessed the marijuana is immaterial, for it was not necessary that appellant’s possession be exclusive.
Whether the parties in the back seat were guilty as principals because they acted with, encouraged or aided appellant, is also not controlling here, the only question being whether or not the facts and circumstances are sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant possessed marijuana as the state charged. I find it to be sufficient.