The opinion
CLARK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree that there is no merit in the grounds taken for the appeal. I am, however, much troubled by the scope of the injunction actually entered; in this matter of purely local concern, not affecting the general public as do railroad or coal strikes, we have an injunction of the broadest form, prohibiting, among other things, “all persons acting in active concert or participation with” the union from “engaging in a strike” or “visiting at the homes of any of the employees” of the charging party to engage in a strike, etc. Before the recent Act such injunctions appear to have been quite clearly objectionable; 1 and the Act itself explicitly preserves some rights to quit work, to express or disseminate views, arguments, and opinion, and to strike, while it directs the court only to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as the court “deems just and proper.” 29 U.S.C. A. §§ 143, 158(c), 160 (j,k), 163. Nevertheless it cannot be gainsaid that the Act does put the federal courts far into the task of terminating strikes, and perhaps it is not greatly worth while for an intermediate court to try to dress up the details of an injunction of its own motion. Hence I am, somewhat reluctantly, concurring in this result, although, as appears in the accompanying case, I do think respondent should have the right of court review of these matters without drastic and cumulative penalties against it.
See Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774, 775 , 62 S.Ct. 816 , 86 L.Ed. 1178 ; Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725, 727, 728 , 62 S.Ct. 807 , 86 L.Ed. 1143 .