work-product privilege extends to documents which themselves do not contain admissible evidence of the offense but instead are summaries of the evidence or discussions about the offense that have been prepared for the internal use of law enforcement officers
How later courts described this case
- work-product privilege extends to documents which themselves do not contain admissible evidence of the offense but instead are summaries of the evidence or discussions about the offense that have been prepared for the internal use of law enforcement officers
- “The Edwards requirements do not mean that any alteration in a tape renders the tape per se inadmissible. If the alteration is accidental and is sufficiently explained so that its presence does not affect the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence, the recording can still be admitted.”
- defendant may have been entitled to a continuance based on the State’s discovery, right before he testified, that the victim of an extraneous offense was able to identify the defendant
- providing that the trial court has discretion to order discovery pursuant to article 39.14
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Ehrke, Robert Bradley, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 505 (2015)
592 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“appellant does not have a general right to discovery of evidence in the possession of the State . . . Art. 39.14 makes it clear that the decision on what is discoverable is committed to the discretion of the trial court”) (internal citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds Ehrke v. State, 459 S.W.3d 606
The opinion
*949 ODOM, Judge,
dissenting.
I join the conclusion that this conviction must be reversed for the underlying factual events relied on by Judge Roberts in his dissent. I differ from his conclusion only in that I would hold those facts support a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, instead of ineffective assistance of counsel. The root cause for the miscarriage in this case was not ineffectiveness on the part of appellant’s counsel; it was the misrepresentation made by the prosecutor. Cf. Ruth v. State, 522 S.W.2d 517 . No cloud should be cast on appellant’s counsel for placing reliance on the representations of another professional. This conviction should be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct. I dissent to its affirmance.
CLINTON, J., joins this opinion.