Opinion

Collins v. Director of Revenue

  • 691 S.W.2d 246
  • 1985 Mo. LEXIS 257
Court
Supreme Court of Missouri
Filed
May 29, 1985
Status
Published
Author
Rendlen
On the bench
Gunn, Higgins, Billings, Blackmar, Donnelly, Rendlen, Welliver
Cited by
145 cases

superseded by regulation as stated in Sellenriek v. Dir. of Revenue, 826 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1992)

How later courts described this case

  • superseded by regulation as stated in Sellenriek v. Dir. of Revenue, 826 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1992)
  • summary license suspension statute which allows for conviction of violators of drunk driving laws with blood alcohol content of .13 percent, rather than .10 percent required for misdemeanor conviction, held not arbitrary or capricious

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RENDLEN, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. If no evidence was presented at the de novo hearings establishing that, at the time of arrest, the officers had probable cause to believe that each of the appellants was driving while the alcohol concentration was 13/100 of one percent or more, then reversal would seem to be proper. However, because of the uncertainty in this new procedure remand should be ordered to allow for the development of evidence regarding the arresting officer’s belief.

Section 302.505.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, explicitly requires that the arresting officer have “probable cause to believe” at the time of the arrest that the subject’s alcohol concentration was 13/100 of one percent or more. Moreover, the section provides that the department shall suspend the driver’s license only upon its determination that the arresting officer had probable cause for such belief. That is, did the suspect appear more than mildly intoxicated at the time of arrest? What behavior informed the officer of the level of intoxication? However, a careful reading of the statute does not permit the department to suspend a driver’s license merely on the basis of the officer’s initial belief, as the principal opinion suggests. The statute clearly refers to alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath — indicating that subsequent testing will occur which, if in verification of the officer’s belief, shall lead to license suspension. Thus, to conform the process to the statutory requirement these cases should be remanded for further proceedings to develop evidence regarding the arresting officer’s beliefs at the time of arrest and if the necessary probable cause is shown the evidence of any subsequent chemical tests should be considered and these facts in combination would provide the basis for the administrative license suspension determination.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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