“A statute may be penal in one part and remedial in another. If a statute which is penal in part gives a remedy for an injury to the person injured to the extent that it gives such remedy it is a remedial statute, irrespective of whether it limits the recovery to the amount of actual loss sustained or as cumulative damages as compensation for the injury.... But in so far as the statute authorizes a third person, not the loser, to recover treble damages or the money lost, the statute is pe-nal_” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- “A statute may be penal in one part and remedial in another. If a statute which is penal in part gives a remedy for an injury to the person injured to the extent that it gives such remedy it is a remedial statute, irrespective of whether it limits the recovery to the amount of actual loss sustained or as cumulative damages as compensation for the injury.... But in so far as the statute authorizes a third person, not the loser, to recover treble damages or the money lost, the statute is pe-nal_” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
- "A cause of action which is given by a federal statute, if no specific provision is made by act of Congress for its survival, survives or not according to the principles of the common law.”
- “statutes of a state are plainly without application to cases which originate under an act of Congress.”
- anti-trust suit for damages
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HOUGH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). With the larger part of the majority opinion I entirely agree, and think it demonstrates that this action abates as to any defendant deceased, unless abatement is prevented by some statutory provision. But I cannot agree that any statutory reason for nonabatement is found in section 7 of the Sherman Act; i. e., I consider the distinction drawn between the words “business” and “property” by the majority opinion to be quite illusory, or unreal.
That there is a difference in meaning or breadth of meaning between the words “business” and “property” does not assist de-_ cisión in this case. Much property is not business, but all business is property; consequently under this statute I see no distinction between the two words, in so far as abatement of action is concerned. For this reason alone I dissent.