"[W]e hold that the Board of Claims has jurisdiction to determine whether a contract has been 'entered into’ for purposes of the Act.”
How later courts described this case
- "[W]e hold that the Board of Claims has jurisdiction to determine whether a contract has been 'entered into’ for purposes of the Act.”
- “the [b]oard of [c]laims is empowered to entertain all contractual claims against the [commonwealth irrespective of the type of relief sought or the fact that the [b]oard of [c]laims may not have the power to grant the relief requested”; [emphasis in original]; “cases can be appealed to Commonwealth Court for review and correction of any legal errors alleged by the parties”
- “Although the Commonwealth traditionally had sovereign immunity from suit, the establishment of the Board of Claims waived that immunity by providing a tribunal whose specific duty was to entertain contract actions against the Commonwealth”
- “We have construed the language of the enabling statute to mean that the Board of Claims is empowered to entertain all contractual claims against the Commonwealth” provided the amount in controversy exceeded $300
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Appellee’s objective as one to merely establish the enforceability of a contract between it and Appellant. For that reason, I would affirm the Commonwealth Court’s opinion granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Shovel and denying summary judgment to Appellants Simpson and Hershock.
In Shovel Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Simpson, 112 Pa.Commw. 129, 535 A.2d 251 (1987), the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine, by way of preliminary objections, whether jurisdiction over this matter lay with the Commonwealth Court or with the Pennsylvania Board of Claims. It determined that the Commonwealth Court had jurisdiction, but instructed Appellants Simpson and Her-shock to answer on the issue of whether or not their signatures were needed to establish a valid contract.
In a memorandum opinion filed June 10, 1988, the Commonwealth Court determined that the signatures were not necessary for the establishment of a valid contract, and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee Shovel. Appeal was taken to this Court.
The majority states that “Commonwealth Court characterized this action as an attempt by Shovel to discern whether Appellants were proper signatories to the contract, and, if so, to compel them to sign it. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court determined that the action was not a contract claim, and that the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims had not been invoked.” Majority Opinion at 3. The majority opines that the “true objective is to establish the *245 enforceability of that contract, which is clearly a contract claim.”
I disagree with this statement. The issue of formation of a contract is not within the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims but rather, must be determined by the Commonwealth Court. The enabling statute, 72 Pa.S. § 4651-1, provides that the duty of the Board of Claims “shall be to be arbitrate claims against the Commonwealth arising from contracts entered into by the Commonwealth ...” The dispositive issue is whether the Board of Claims can ever determine its jurisdiction when a prerequisite of the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims is that a contract between the Commonwealth and another party be entered into. The plain language of the statutory authority indicates that if there is a question of whether a contract has been entered into, the Board of Claims has no jurisdiction.
Our opinion in Keenheel v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 523 Pa. 223 , 565 A.2d 1147 , supports this interpretation. In that case, Appellant Keenheel was seeking to rescind a contract. In my concurrence, I noted that a claim of recission “does not seek to enforce a contract; it seeks a declaration that the contract is of no effect.” Id., 523 Pa. at p. 231 , 565 A.2d at 1151 , Zappala, J. concurring. I further reasoned that if the Commonwealth Court determined that recission was an inappropriate remedy, a claim within the jurisdiction of the Board, as to the enforceability of the contract, may exist.
For these reasons, I agree with the Commonwealth Court’s determination that jurisdiction to determine whether or not a contract has been entered into lies with that court, and not with the Board of Claims. I would affirm the judgment of that Court, and its declaration that a valid contract existed, notwithstanding the absence of Appellants’ signatures.
FLAHERTY, Justice,