explaining that calling conduct “improper” for tortious interference purpose’s “is simply another way of saying that the alleged tortfeasor’s conduct” is not “legally justified”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that calling conduct “improper” for tortious interference purpose’s “is simply another way of saying that the alleged tortfeasor’s conduct” is not “legally justified”
- holding only that, although a party cannot interfere with its own contract, a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it
- concluding that an at-will employee at a department store could bring a claim for tortious' interference with a contract against an agent- of her employer
- affirming judgment in favor of at-will employee who had an employment contract with her employer on her interference-with-contractual-relations claim against a former supervisor who acted maliciously in procuring her termination
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MACK, Associate Judge,
concurring:
While I concur fully in this opinion, I want to go on record as favoring reconsid *293 eration, by the en banc court, of the doctrine that an at-will employee “could be terminated at will by his [or her] employer for any reason or no reason at all.” See Wemhoffv. Investors Management Corp., 528 A.2d 1205 , 1208 n. 3 (D.C.1987), citing Taylor v. Greenway Restaurant, Inc., 173 A.2d 211 (D.C.1961); see also Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (Ferren, J., dissenting).