holding that safety reasons can justify stop in the absence of suspected traffic infraction if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts and not a pretext stop; case remanded for determination as to whether officer was justified in stopping motorist to warn him of improper lane usage
How later courts described this case
- holding that safety reasons can justify stop in the absence of suspected traffic infraction if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts and not a pretext stop; case remanded for determination as to whether officer was justified in stopping motorist to warn him of improper lane usage
- upholding evidence obtained during stop to promote safety. "If we were to insist upon suspicion of activity amounting to a criminal or civil infraction ..., we would be overlooking the police officer's legitimate role as a public servant to assist those in distress and to maintain and foster public safety"
- reasoning 5 that "[s]afety reasons alone can be sufficient if they are based upon 'specific and articulable facts."'
- vacating suppression where officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to pull defendant over after observing defendant pass straight through intersection despite being in right lane marked with right turn directional arrow
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GLASSMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the court that a possible future risk to the safety of persons or property warrants the intrusion of a present stop of a motor vehicle. I would affirm the decision of the District Court.
At the hearing to suppress the evidence seized after the stop of Pinkham’s car, the police officer testified that neither the speed of the car nor the manner in which it was driven caused him to stop the car. The officer stopped Pinkham’s vehicle after it went straight ahead when the directional arrow painted on the pavement indicated that the lane should be used for a right turn. There was no other vehicular or pedestrian traffic in the area. He made the stop at 2:00 a.m. in Skowhegan “purely for safety reasons ... to inform [Pinkham] that in the future, should he use the lanes, to be sure to advise other drivers of his intentions.” The District Court found that no traffic violation had occurred and that Pinkham’s “driving in the right lane rather than the middle lane as he went through the intersection at 2:00 a.m. with no other traffic on the road is not a significant act and I so find.” The court concluded that “on these facts” the stop was not warranted and granted Pinkham’s motion to suppress the seized evidence.
It is clear that on the evidence before it that the District Court could have found that the officer could not reasonably believe that any risk to the safety of persons or property had occurred, was present or was imminent, and could properly conclude, as the court did, that the intrusion of the stop was not warranted. See State v. *321 Cote, 518 A.2d 454, 456 (Me.1986) (trial court’s conclusion on ultimate question of whether stop warranted must stand if any competent evidence in record supports it); State v. Moulton, 481 A.2d 155, 163 (Me.1984) (in addition to facts found, must be assumed trial court found for defendant on all factual issues necessarily invoked in ultimate favorable decision for defendant).
In vacating the trial court’s decision, this court establishes a new and different standard to govern the legality of a stop for safety reasons. This standard differs significantly from the well-established standard governing the validity of a stop for a believed civil infraction or a criminal violation that we have previously applied to a stop for safety reasons. The court today holds that the police officer’s apparent concern that at some future time Pinkham might not comply with the painted directional arrow when other vehicular or pedestrian traffic might be at the intersection is a sufficient “specific and articulable fact” to give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that safety reasons warrant the intrusion of a stop.
This is a substantial departure from the holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me.1983), that the specific and articu-lable facts when viewed objectively must form a basis for a reasonable belief that criminal activity [or a civil infraction] had taken place, was taking place or imminently would occur. In State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 979 (Me.1987), we reemphasized that if the facts did not meet this standard the court would be sanctioning stops on a mere hunch or on speculation contrary to the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
Nothing in our decision in State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224 (Me.1989), suggests that we departed from this well-established rule set forth in Terry, Griffin, and Caron . In Fuller , applying the standard of Terry and Griffin , we found no clear error in the trial court’s finding that a police officer’s testimony that Fuller’s car approached him at 6:30 p.m. on October 9, 1987 with its headlights blinking on and off four or five times within a quarter mile supported an objectively reasonable belief that the headlights were defective. As in the other cases cited by the court, —State v. Puig, 112 Ariz. 519 , 544 P.2d 201 (1975) (defective turn signal); State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508 , 533 P.2d 1143 (1975) (bouncing left rear tire) — Full er dealt with observable defective equipment on the vehicle stopped. In each of these cases, the specific observable defect would warrant a reasonable belief that there was a present or imminent risk to the safety of persons or property. The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable as no equipment defect was present.
I find no authority, nor does the court cite any, to support the proposition it advances today: that the intrusion of a stop can be justified on the basis of a possible future risk to the safety of persons or property.