“[W]hen faced with a case raising constitutional and non-constitutional grounds, a court must decide the matter on non-constitutional grounds and avoid constitutional questions if possible.”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]hen faced with a case raising constitutional and non-constitutional grounds, a court must decide the matter on non-constitutional grounds and avoid constitutional questions if possible.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately because I believe that Wallace v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 342 , 393 A.2d 43 (1978), was wrongly decided.
Unemployment compensation was initially established to provide a safety net for persons who lost their job, either temporarily or permanently, because of economic factors beyond their control, such as a recession or a plant closing. Unemployment compensation benefits were intended to bridge the gap for these persons while they sought alternate employment. At some point the General Assembly expanded the program to provide this economic bridge to persons who lost their job for compelling job-related reasons, such as on the job discrimination or harassment or an employer’s illegal recording of telephone calls. Wallace, 393 A.2d at 46 . However, the General Assembly also made it clear that leaving a job for compelling, but not job-related reasons, did not entitle one to benefits. Specifically, leaving a job to follow a spouse or to care for a parent or child did not entitle one to benefits.
Using the rational relationship test, this Court in Wallace found the domestic reason exclusion from benefits to violate principles of equal protection. 1 The decision was reached by a four to three vote, with one of the four votes a concurrence in the result. More important than the close vote is the fact that the jurisprudence expressed in Wallace is dated and not consistent with more recent holdings of the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts. Economic legislation nearly always survives a rational relationship challenge. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 , 97 S.Ct. 1898 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977); Prince v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 832 A.2d 583 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).
The General Assembly revised the Unemployment Compensation Law to eliminate the statutory, provision struck down in Wallace . Accordingly, leaving a job for non job-related, domestic reasons does not render one ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Now we have a statutory scheme whereby judges decide what domestic reason for leaving a job qualifies one for benefits. Since we judges have decided the contours of the follow-the-spouse doctrine, we are free to change that doctrine to include couples that are unmarried, whether by choice or compul *270 sion. I believe, however, that the General Assembly, not judges, should make the hard policy decisions on eligibility. Legislators have access to all kinds of relevant information that courts do not have, and they, not judges, are best suited to deciding when an expansion of benefits is appropriate, fair and affordable.
. Finding the legislation’s eligibility standards to violate equal protection, this Court went on to find an ancillary due process violation, holding that each unemployed person had the right to prove his reasons for leaving a job, whether domestic or job-related, to be compelling.