The opinion
CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I concur in the denial of Timken Silent Automatic’s motion to dismiss, but believe that a like disposition should be made of Timken-Detroit Axle’s similar motion. Both these motions challenge our jurisdiction in the premises. Whatever may be the merits of the issues here presented, I think there can be no question of the jurisdiction of this court under § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (e), to adjudicate those issues on the Board’s petition for enforcement of its order. The Axle Company had notice of all the supplementary proceedings before the Board; its interests were ably protected throughout them by the counsel who support this motion; and it is actually before us asserting its rights with determined vigor. Our power to act, whether it be to protect its interests or to uphold the Board’s order, surely exists. And that is the only question which, in my judgment, is properly before us on this motion.
An adjudication of the merits of the issue whether Axle must carry out the Board’s order as successors and assigns of Silent Automatic should await consideration of the full record, with briefs and argument directed to the question of the validity and effect of the Board’s Supplemental Findings and Order. Though not before us on the brief argument had of these motions, there appears in our files a “Supplemental Transcript of Record,” a volume of over five hundred printed pages. Therein appears extensive evidence offered to support detailed findings of the Board of such relevant facts as that Silent Automatic was a wholly owned subsidiary of Axle, that Axle dictated Silent Automatic’s labor policies and controlled and dominated its affairs, that Axle caused dissolution of Silent Automatic, conveyed all the latter’s assets to itself, and assumed all of the latter’s obligations with complete notice of the proceedings before the Board. Such findings, it seems to me, bring the case squarely within precedents such as National Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 2 Cir., 104 F.2d 302 , and Union Drawn Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 Cir., 109 F.2d 587, 594 , and, if supported by the evidence, require Axle to execute the Board’s order against its predecessor subsidiary. And such findings should not be rejected on a preliminary challenge to jurisdiction and without careful examination of the supporting evidence.
Moreover it seems to me that our decision herein cannot fail to be confusing, if not misleading, to the parties concerned. For in National Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co., supra ( 104 F.2d 302 ), we decided that the “successor” company could be held in contempt of an enforcement order of this Court, even though we had declined previously ( 98 F. 2d 97 ) to include it as a party expressly named in the order.