finding that probable cause had existed for the institution of criminal proceedings, though a prima facie case had not been established
How later courts described this case
- finding that probable cause had existed for the institution of criminal proceedings, though a prima facie case had not been established
- holding that rearrest was proper even though the same charge was dismissed at prior preliminary hearing
- finding probable cause existed for the institution of criminal proceedings, though a pri-ma facie case had not been established
- observing that the “restrain” charge has been “sanctioned time and again” by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; citing cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I must emphatically dissent. For at least two centuries, the law has required that the prosecution prove a citizen’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. No such proof is present in this case. While walking along the street with his wife late at night, appellant was bumped by a stranger who approached from the opposite direction. Violent wrestling follows. What is a citizen to do? He knows the man with whom he is wrestling is accompanied by a male companion. He also knows his wife is present. Should he politely ask the stranger, “Is my life — or my wife’s life — in danger?” Can any citizen be said to be acting unreasonably if he takes a weapon and strikes first in such a situation? This was not a bar room fight between people who knew each other. This incident took place between strangers, late at night, on an open street.
Of course, had there been evidence that appellant was the aggressor who started a fight even though he had the option of continuing along the sidewalk with his wife after bumping the victim, inferences would be warranted concerning his criminal intentions. The majority, however, points to no such evidence. íhe burden of proof is on the prosecution, and it failed to prove that appellant had any criminal intent — it proved only that appellant used a weapon to protect himself as any reasonable person might do under the circumstances. Appellant’s conviction should be reversed *31 and appellant discharged on the voluntary manslaughter charge as well as the weapons charges.