stating that “cross-examination directed toward revealing possible bias, interest or motive of a witness in testifying against the defendant is -4- J-S25010-23 always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of [her] testimony”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “cross-examination directed toward revealing possible bias, interest or motive of a witness in testifying against the defendant is -4- J-S25010-23 always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of [her] testimony”
- reiterating that “cross-examination directed toward revealing possible bias, interest or motive of a witness in testifying against the defendant is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony”
- holding that “breaches of official duty are included within the types of conduct described as ‘affirmative interference[s] with governmental functions.’”
- any error in disallowing cross-examination regarding the witness’ pending criminal charge and possible bias was deemed harmless when that witness’ testimony was confirmed by other witnesses at trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s determination that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain appellant’s conviction for obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function. I find no merit in appellant’s contention that the “breach of official duty” forming the basis for his prosecution under section 5101 of the Crimes Code must in itself constitute a criminal act. A breach of official duty becomes criminal under section 5101 when it is undertaken intentionally “with the purpose and effect of obstructing a governmental function.” Model Penal Code, § 242.1, Comment at p. 206. In the instant case, I am satisfied that the jury could have found that appellant breached his duty as a district justice to impartially administer justice by exerting undue influence upon Chief Thomas to provide favorable treatment regarding the traffic citation which had been issued to Andrew Kramer.
I also agree with the majority’s determination that the trial court erred when it refused to permit appellant to cross-examine Chief Thomas regarding his fear of prosecution or loss of employment stemming from his own involvement in signing the name of another officer on the substituted citation charging Andrew Kramer with a lesser offense. Such cross-examination would have been directly relevant to exploring the potential bias, interest or motive of Chief Thomas in testifying against appellant. Upon review of the record, how *391 ever, I am unable to agree with the majority that this error was harmless. I cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of appellant’s trial would not have been different if the trial court had not improperly limited the cross-examination of Chief Thomas. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.