determining that factual matters are properly left to the jurors as factfinders, and this Court will not “substitute the jury’s findings with [its own] view of the evidence”
How later courts described this case
- determining that factual matters are properly left to the jurors as factfinders, and this Court will not “substitute the jury’s findings with [its own] view of the evidence”
- explaining the difference between the standard utilized when this Court reviews a motion for a new trial based on weight of the evidence, as opposed to insufficiency of the evidence
- emphasizing that a trial justice should “cautiously exercise his or her discretion, ever mindful of the potential for prejudicial error,” when the state seeks to limit or exclude evidence in a criminal case
- holding that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence may be brought as a motion for a new trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBINSON, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
I am pleased to be able to concur in the entirety of the Court’s significant and articulate opinion with the sole exception of the portion of the opinion that deals with the sufficiency of the evidence. As to that portion of the opinion, I must respectfully dissent. 25 In my judgment, it is clear as matter of law 26 that there is insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the defendant’s conviction of felony assault.
The felony assault statute in this state makes punishable as a felony “an assault or battery, or both, * * * which results in serious bodily injury * * G.L.1956 § ll-5-2(a). That statute then goes on, in subsection (c), to define the term “[s]erious bodily injury” as meaning a “physical injury” that:
“(1) Creates a substantial risk of death;
“(2) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
“(3) Causes serious permanent disfigurement * * Section 11-5-2(c). 27
The central issue in the instant case is the ambit of subsection (3) § ll-5-2(c)— specifically the meaning of “serious permanent disfigurement.” The defendant was convicted of felony assault on the basis of a contention that two small scars above the hairline on Mr. Skwirz’s scalp (one measuring 3 centimeters in length and the other 1.5 centimeters) constitute “serious permanent disfigurement” and thereby fall within the “serious bodily injury” requirement of the felony assault statute.
I do not question the fact that the scars on Mr. Skwirz’s scalp are “permanent”— that being one of the three elements set forth in the pertinent statutory definition. For the purposes of this dissent, I also do not challenge the fact that said scars could *585 be considered to constitute a “disfigurement” (however slight) — another element specifically set forth in the statute. 28 However, it is clear to me that, as a matter of law, those scars do not rise to the level of being “serious” physical injury — another element that is explicitly required under the felony assault statute.
Although § 11-5-2 does not provide a definition for the adjective “serious,” I believe that the meaning of that word in the context of the statute at issue can be established through application of the “nosei-tur a sotáis ” canon of statutory construction. 29 That venerable principle counsels that when there is doubt as to the meaning of particular statutory language, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1161 (R.I.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 , 119 S.Ct. 2090 , 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (“Statutory language must be read in context and a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 667 (R.I.2004); Black’s Law Dictionary 1087 (8th ed. 2004).
It is readily apparent that § 11-5-2 operates so as to criminalize assaults and/or batteries which result in extreme physical injuries — notably, injuries that can create a “substantial risk of death” (§ 11-5-2(c)(1)), that eause “protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ” (§ ll-5-2(c)(2)), or that constitute female genital mutilation (§ 11-5-2(c)(3)). In light of the profound seriousness of the injuries specifically referenced in the statute, the words “serious permanent disfigurement,” which are employed in the same subsection must logically entail physical injury of a similar degree of severity.
In my judgment, the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial with respect to the felony assault charge was quite insufficient as a matter of law to prove serious physical injury. Mr. Skwirz’s medical records from South County Hospital, prepared the day of the incident, belie the seriousness of his injuries. Despite a significant amount of bleeding, the emergency room doctor described both of Mr. Skwirz’s scalp wounds as “superficial.” Aside from these scalp injuries, the only other physical complaint noted was a “mild” headache. Although temporary staples were used to close the small wounds, they were removed approximately two weeks later, whereupon the emergen *586 cy room physician noted that the cuts were “healing.”
Jack R. Bevivino, M.D., the plastic surgeon hired by Mr. Skwirz’s attorney to examine the witness’s scalp injuries approximately three months after the incident, observed two small scars — constituting less than 5 centimeters of visible scarring in total — above the hairline. He observed that there was “no evidence of any bone defect on palpation,” and he added that “[n]o further treatment should be required.” Doctor Bevivino concluded that Mr. Skwirz’s “[pjrognosis is good.” At trial, the state elicited testimony from Dr. Bevivino establishing that, in his expert medical opinion, he considered the scars to be permanent. Doctor Bevivino did not testify that he believed the scars constituted a serious injury, and the state did not attempt to elicit any testimony from him to that effect. Indeed, it does not appear that the state offered any testimony concerning the seriousness of Mr. Skwirz’s permanent disfigurement. Considering the proffered medical evidence in its entirety, it is in no way comparable to the other types of physical injury encompassed by the felony assault statute. Mr. Skwirz’s injuries were not life-threatening, nor did they impair or destroy any part of his body. They appear to be trivial even by the accounts of his own doctors. 30
While such aggressive conduct as allegedly occurred in this case is certainly not to be condoned, it should go without saying that clear statutory criteria must be satisfied for a conviction to be sustainable. I do not believe that the evidence proffered by the prosecution was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements in this case, and therefore I believe that the conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Paret-Ruiz, 567 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2009).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. I wish to emphasize that I am not dissenting from the Court’s ruling concerning the standard of review with respect to sufficiency of the evidence contentions. I am dissenting only from the Court’s ruling that there was in fact sufficient evidence to support a conviction in this case.
. In my judgment, the existence of “serious permanent disfigurement" (vel non) is a matter for objective determination; as a result, it need not always constitute a question of fact for resolution by the trier of fact. It seems to me that determination of the seriousness (vel non ) of a scar is a matter of common knowledge and experience that can by resolved by the court unless there is a dispute regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury; no such dispute exists in the instant case.
.I would note that G.L.1956 § 11 — 5—2(c)(3), the subsection of the felony assault statute that contains the “serious permanent disfigurement” language, also criminalizes any battery which "circumcises, excises or infibu-lates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of a person.” Such acts, commonly referred to as female genital mutilation, are almost universally regarded (in our culture) as a bodily injury of an extremely high degree of seriousness — an injury that is of an utterly different order of magnitude from that sustained by Mr. Skwirz.
. It is important to emphasize that, given the statutory requirement that the disfigurement be "permanent,” the "disfigurement” that is referenced in the statute must be considered as it existed at the time of trial — and not as it existed when the assault occurred. For that reason, I believe that the Court’s references to the blood on defendant’s clothes on the night of the incident and to the fact that the victim was treated with staples are quite literally irrelevant. See Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The sole focus of the trial court should have been on Mr. Skwirz's permanent injuries — i.e., the condition of his scalp at the time of trial.
. The Latin maxim can be translated into English as ”[i]t is known by its associates.” Latin for Lawyers 195 (3d ed. 1960). That same handbook paraphrases the maxim as follows:
"[Wjhere the meaning of a particular word is doubtful or obscure, or where a particular expression when taken singly is inoperative, the intention of a party who used it may frequently be ascertained by looking at adjoining words, or at expressions occurring in other parts of the same instrument.” Id.
. I would note that this conclusion is in accord with the standards propounded by other states which also require proof of serious, permanent, and disfiguring injury in order to sustain various criminal and civil causes of action. See, e.g., State v. Malufau, 80 Hawai'i 126 , 906 P.2d 612, 618 (1995) (holding that a two-inch scar on the forehead could not be considered "serious” disfigurement); Kelly v. State, 153 P.3d 926, 930 (Wyo. 2007) (noting that a scar above the hairline which was not readily visible did not constitute "severe disfigurement” under the state felony assault statute and further noting that only "rare, remarkable injuries that required surgery or resulted in inpatient hospitalization and scarring constitute serious bodily injuries.”); see also Gonzales v. State, 2002 WL 31778672 , *2 (Tex.Ct.App.2002) (not designated for publication) ("There is no dispute that the cut on Sophia's scalp will result in some type of scar. However, as numerous cases discussing scars make clear, the type of scar with which we are concerned, located on the back of Sophia's head and within the hair line, does not amount to 'serious permanent disfigurement' within the purview of the statute.”). Many of these cases involve injuries significantly more severe and more visible than Mr. Skwirz’s scars in the instant case.