stating that "heightened foreseeability 'does not require previous occurrences of the particular type of harm, but can be met instead by a combination of factors which give defendants an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act' ” (quoting Doe, 524 A.2d at 33)
How later courts described this case
- stating that "heightened foreseeability 'does not require previous occurrences of the particular type of harm, but can be met instead by a combination of factors which give defendants an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act' ” (quoting Doe, 524 A.2d at 33)
- stating that in Kline, " 'crimes of violence, robbery, and assault [] had been occurring with mounting frequency on the premises' and the landlord had been asked to secure the building in light of the crime” (quoting Kline, 439 F.2d at 480)
- stating that “heightened foreseeability factors directly into the duty analysis” and that “consideration of whether a duty exists to protect another from intervening criminal acts includes consideration of heightened foreseeability”
- noting that, in the special category of injury resulting from an intervening criminal act, "heightened foreseeability factors directly into the duty analysis because a defendant is only liable for the intervening criminal acts of another ‘if the criminal act is so foreseeable that a duty arises to guard against it.' ” (quoting McKethean, 588 A.2d at 717)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEWMAN, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
An experienced District of Columbia trial judge, fully familiar with the controlling cases on the issue relevant in this appeal, beginning with our decision in Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C.1969), and continuing with such cases as Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 141 U.S.App.D.C. 370 , 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.Cir.1970); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30 (D.C.1987); Potts v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249 (D.C.1997); and District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C.2005) (en banc), as well as other cases cited in the majority *876 opinion, determined that the DiSalvos had presented a sufficient quantum of evidence from which a reasonable juror, acting reasonably, could conclude that the University of the District of Columbia had breached the duty owed to the DiSalvos under these cases. The trial judge instructed the jury on this issue, instructions to which no relevant objections were made. Based on the evidence and these instructions on the law, twelve residents of the District of Columbia, serving as jurors, unanimously found that the University of the District of Columbia had breached its duty to the DiSal-vos, as defined by our jurisprudence. Now, two judges of this court hold, as a matter of law, that the experienced trial judge and all twelve jurors acted unreasonably. Because I find myself in agreement with the “unreasonable thirteen,” rather than the “reasonable two,” I dissent.