The opinion
DOYLE, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority, in my view, analyzes the situation before us incorrectly. It holds that Harristown Development Corporation (HDC) does not fall within the definition of an “agency” either in the Sunshine Act or the Right to Know Law. This is true. The majority then concludes that HDC is not an agency. The error of this analysis is that it ignores Act 153. The very purpose of Act 153 was to amend the definition of “agency” under the Sunshine Act and the Right to Know Law. The majority’s view implies *192 that Act 153 has no legal effect. It is, however, an act of the General Assembly like any other and must be respected by this Court as an amendment to those laws, like any other.
Whether Act 153 is unconstitutional is a separate question; and although the majority ultimately concludes that it is unconstitutional, that does not mean, as the majority implies, that the legislature lacked authority to pass the law initially. The majority’s implication, in my view, is not only legally incorrect but constitutes dangerous interloping into the legislative branch and severely strains the separation of powers doctrine. As our Supreme Court said in Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158 , 507 A.2d 323 (1986), “[w]e believe that nothing is more basic to the independence and integrity of the legislature than its ability to pass legislation.” Id., 510 Pa. at 173 , 507 A.2d at 330 .
I must also disagree with the majority’s position that Act 153 offends Article III, Section 32, and Article I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. We must remember that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that any doubts as to its constitutionality are to be resolved in favor of sustaining the statute. Satinoff v. Commonwealth, 128 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 93, 562 A.2d 996 (1989). And, of course, the burden to prove a statute unconstitutional is on the challenger. Id.
The majority concludes that Act 153 is a special law in violation of Article III, Section 32 and bases this conclusion on the ground that HDC is the only nonprofit corporation regulated by the Act. Legislative classifications, however, are proper under Article III, Section 32 if they are reasonable. Loomis v. Philadelphia School District Board of Education, 376 Pa. 428 , 103 A.2d 769 (1954). In Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a one member class (a city of the first class) is reasonable, as long as the class is open to new members. The Wheeler Court opined that the constitutional integrity of a classification does not depend upon the number in the class and that legislation is intended not just *193 for present but for future needs. Since any nonprofit corporation (including future ones) receiving in excess of $1,500,000 in rent from the Commonwealth is subject to regulation under Act 153, the Act withstands constitutional challenge on a special legislation basis.
Further, I believe that the majority’s determination that the legislative history demonstrates that Act 153 was created specifically to regulate HDC is improper in the procedural context of this case. On summary judgment it is not this Court’s function to decide issues of fact, but to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact. Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa.Superior Ct. 135, 476 A.2d 928 (1984). The Court’s determination that the legislature, in essence, had a bad motive for passing the Act is disputed. A “finding” to this effect is, accordingly, improper.
I must further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Act 153 impairs the contractual obligations of the Commonwealth and HDC in violation of Article I, Section 17. The contracts in question contain clauses stating that HDC will comply with “all present and future laws.” Lease for State Office Building No. 1 at paragraph 15; Lease for State Office Building No. 2 at paragraph 14. Thus, the agreements between HDC and the Commonwealth clearly express that HDC will be held subject to laws passed after the execution of the contracts. In Helicon Corp. v. Borough of Brownsville, 68 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 375, 449 A.2d 118 (1982), this Court held that Article I, Section 17 was not offended when a borough, subsequent to the formation of a contract with a cable television company containing a present and future laws clause, imposed new regulations on the cable television company. Following this reasoning, I would hold that Act 153 does not violate Article I, Section 17. For all the above-stated reasons I would deny HDC’s motion for summary judgment.
With regard to the issue concerning Senator Tilghman, here again, I respectfully disagree. The majority concludes that HDC is not an agency, but a private corporation. It further reasons, however, that the Senator can gain access *194 to the information he seeks because as a Committee Chairperson he “has the responsibility to review and investigate the expenditure of Commonwealth funds.” Not surprisingly there is no citational authority for the statement that the Senator’s position as Committee Chairperson gives him the authority he now seeks to exercise. Unlike Eastland v. United States Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 , 95 S.Ct. 1813 , 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975), Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 , 93 S.Ct. 2018 , 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973), and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), all relied upon by the Senator in his claim that his actions fall within the Speech and Debate Clause, there is no allegation here that the Senator’s actions were taken pursuant to an investigation authorized by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The mere fact that the Senator used his official stationary does not, in my view, transform his actions into official ones. And while the Senator may maintain that he acted in his official capacity, and no doubt he genuinely believes that he has, whether his actions fall within the sphere of legislative debate is a question of law and cannot be resolved by relying upon what the Senator believes the law to be.
Because I can discern no authority to support the notion that Senator Tilghman was acting within the legislative sphere, his right to the information sought turns upon whether Act 153 is upheld. If it were upheld he would be entitled to the information not because he is a Senator, but because he would have the same right as any other citizen. But if, as the majority concludes, HDC is a private corporation, he is not, on that conclusion, entitled to the information. As our Supreme Court observed in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2625 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972):
No prior case has held that members of Congress would be immune ... if, in order to secure information for [a] hearing, [they] ... invaded the privacy of a citizen.
My conclusion would of course be different if some type of investigation had been authorized by the Senate Appropria *195 tions Committee. That is not, however, the fact here. Accordingly, I would deny Senator Tilghman’s motion for summary judgment.