The opinion
KELLY, Associate Judge
(dissenting):
The majority correctly states that before suspending the license of an uninsured motorist who has failed to post security, the District is required by constitutional due process to afford that motorist a hearing. This hearing requirement was set down by *794 the Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589 , 29 L. Ed.2d 90 (1971):
Once licenses-are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the [Fifth] Amendment. . . . [Citations omitted.]
Given this constitutional right to a hearing, which we all recognize, I differ from the majority only on the nature of the hearing that is required. For if a hearing is constitutionally compelled, it is by definition a contested case under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act: 1
[T]he term “contested case” means a proceeding before . . . any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by any law (other than this chapter), or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before ... an agency . . .. [Emphasis added.] 2
In Quick v. Department of Motor Vehicles, D.C.App., 331 A.2d 319, 321 (1975), this court, in determining the precise nature of the hearing required before suspending the license of a drunken driver pursuant to D. C. Code 1973, § 40-302, stated:
Because the privilege of petitioner (a “specific party”) to drive was placed in issue by the order to show cause why his license should not he suspended and because procedural due process requires that a hearing be held prior to permanent suspension, see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the revocation proceeding is a ■ “contested case” and is controlled by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA), D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1501 et seq. . . . [Footnote omitted.]
I perceive no distinction between Quick and this case for both involve suspending the driving privileges of specific parties. Nor, in my judgment, can a distinction be created by characterizing the suspension in Quick as a “final revocation” and a suspension for inability to post security as “conditional”. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1501 ef seq.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 1502(8).