The opinion
VOLINN, Bankruptcy Judge
(dissenting):
Section IV, part B of the majority decision holds that because the state court judgments in question deal with the subject of alimony and because the appellant has conceded that such judgments deal with that subject, the bankruptcy court is precluded from further inquiry into the nature and basis for them. In other words, the concession as to the qualitative aspect of the judgments precludes quantitative inquiry.
In my view, 11 U.S.C. § 523 encompasses an inquiry of the type developed in Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 , 99 S.Ct. 2205 , 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979), and In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.1979), where the quantitative aspect assumes such proportions that it transforms into substantially new dimensions the putative nondischargeable debt. It may be argued that these are matters which were presented for review by the state court and found wanting. However, had this argument been presented with respect to a default judgment involving a dischargeable claim, the bankruptcy court, by virtue of Brown and Houtman would, nevertheless, have opened the matter to determine dischargeability.
Brown and Houtman are leading cases setting forth the right of a debtor to have the bankruptcy court inquire into the background of a debt which a creditor asserts to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 . This right is derived from bedrock policy underlying bankruptcy law. This policy is intended to provide a new opportunity for the debtor to continue his life unhampered by the “pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt”. Brown, supra, 442 U.S. at 128 , 99 S.Ct. at 2207 . Debts asserted by creditors to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 are subject to special scrutiny so that a debtor may not, without good reason, be precluded from realizing his fresh start. This special scrutiny requires that the bankruptcy court inquire into the “true nature” of a judgment debt which a creditor seeks to have excepted from discharge. Brown, supra, at 138 , 99 S.Ct. at 2212 .
*1024 The appellant in this case argues that he is precluded from realizing his fresh start because the bankruptcy court failed to make an appropriate inquiry into the “true nature” of his debt to the appellee.
The debtor admits owing approximately $8,000 which is truly in the nature of unpaid alimony and child support. 1 The default judgment obtained by the appellee is approximately $38,000, or $30,000 more than the debtor admitted to be nondis-chargeable. Even if Brown and Eoutman are read to provide for strict qualitative inquiry, the nearly five-fold disparity between the default amount and that admitted to be nondischargeable, demonstrates a qualitative change.
I agree with the majority that the debtor is precluded from collaterally attacking the validity of the state court judgments. But, I do not feel that he is precluded from using the new defense of § 523 which originated by the filing of bankruptcy. The issue is not whether the debt created by the state court judgment is to be allowed or its amount; but, rather, whether there may be post-bankruptcy enforcement of this particular judgment against the debtor despite the discharge.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the decision of the trial court, remanding for inquiry into the nature and extent of the debt asserted by the former wife to be nondischargeable.
. Admitting that the appellee’s “claim” was for alimony and child support does not constitute an admission that the default judgment extending from such a “claim” was wholly and validly in the nature of alimony and child support.