explaining that the disruption of established business relations “may manifest itself in a loss of new business not subject to documentation, the quantity and quality of which are ‘inherently unascertainable’”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the disruption of established business relations “may manifest itself in a loss of new business not subject to documentation, the quantity and quality of which are ‘inherently unascertainable’”
- holding physician’s violation of restrictive covenant damaged existing patient relationships with prior employer where approximately 125 patients elected to follow her, and based on strength of physician’s relationships with patients, this reasonably foreshadowed continuing exodus of patients
- explaining that “the unbridled threat” of the continuation of the challenged action and “incumbent disruption of … customer relationships” establishes the existence of irreparable harm
- analyzing “quantitative sufficiency of physicians practicing in the restricted area” as part of the public interest analysis, and granting preliminary injunction against oncologist after finding no shortage of oncology services due to presence of numerous oncologists in that area
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ORIE MELVIN, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I believe the trial court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction because greater harm is worked by the issuance of this injunction than would result from its denial. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 2 The preliminary injunction at issue in this case provides as follows:
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Teresa A. Nolan, M.D. is preliminarily enjoined from practicing medicine directly or indirectly or acting adversely to the interests of MSO and MCC within a ten-mile radius of the current Monroe-ville office of Plaintiff MCC, hereinafter, the Restricted Area, until an Adjudication is issued after a final hearing or until May 31, 2003, whichever comes first. Under this Order, the practice of medicine “directly or indirectly” expressly includes Dr. Nolan’s continuing to direct, recommend, refer, or admit patients to Forbes Regional Hospital or its successor, or the Monroeville offices of OHA for treatment by OHA or to any other physicians or health-care providers in the Restricted Area other than MCC physicians.
It is further ORDERED that Dr. Nolan, at her sole expense in language satisfactory to Plaintiffs or to this Court, shall inform all of her current and future patients that, in the event the patient chooses to exercise his or her right to treat with OHA at Forbes Regional Hospital in Monroeville or with any oncologist or oncology group other than Plaintiff MCC within the Restricted Area, Dr. Nolan may not continue to serve as that patient’s oncologist pending further Order of Court, (emphasis added).
¶ 3 When considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction, one of the most important factors to be taken into account is whether greater harm is caused by issuing the injunction than by refusing it. School District of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Education Association, 542 Pa. 335, 339 , 667 A.2d 5, 7 (1995). Moreover, “where an adverse effect upon the public interest will result from granting a preliminary injunction, it should not be granted.” Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 535 A.2d 231 (1987), affirmed 528 Pa. 355 , 598 A.2d 256 (1991)). In the context of restraints on physicians our courts apply close judicial scrutiny because of the value *303 of physicians’ services to the community. New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1978).
¶4 In this case the trial court fashioned an injunction which went beyond enforcing the restrictive covenant against Dr. Nolan. The injunction specifically restricts the actions of her patients. The injunction in this case goes far beyond requiring patients to drive an extra distance in order to continue treatment with Dr. Nolan. This directive infringes on the rights of Dr. Nolan’s patients by preventing them from seeking ancillary treatment and services from other health care providers in the restricted area. It was not enough for the trial court to restrict the patients’ relationship with Dr. Nolan, the court restricted patients’ rights to obtain medical services with other physicians. Pursuant to the injunction, if patients exercise their rights to treat with any other oncology group other than MCC, they cannot continue to treat with Dr. Nolan. Such a restriction creates scenarios where patients cannot undergo such rudimentary procedures as giving blood without the risk losing their doctor. I find this restriction entirely too broad.
¶ 6 The rights of patients to seeks ancillary medical care from other physicians is deserving of more attention from the law than appellees’ expectation of profit from its commercial transaction with Dr. Nolan. While I recognize appellees, like any business, can contract with others, including Dr. Nolan, in such a way as to protect its financial interests, the injunction goes beyond protecting such interests. Dr. Nolan’s patients are not the property or chattel of appellees. Nor are they in privity with appellees. In this case, I believe greater harm is caused by issuing the injunction than by refusing it. I would reverse the decision of the trial court.