The opinion
JONES, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority opinion that the Commonwealth Court erroneously denied to itself the power to issue writs of prohibition. However, because I believe that the Commonwealth Court made the proper disposition of appellant’s petition in light of the judicial requirements surrounding the issuance of this extraordinary writ, I must dissent.
*215 A writ of prohibition is issued as a matter of discretion to prevent a lower tribunal from acting outside its jurisdiction. McNair’s Petition, 324 Pa. 48 , 187 A. 498 (1936). My reading of the Commonwealth Court Act of 1970, 17 P.S. § 211.1 et seq., convinces me that the Commonwealth Court’s power to issue a writ of prohibition is limited to the circumstances where issuance by that Court is necessary to prevent the usurpation of its jurisdiction by a lower tribunal. Cf. § 8(g) (“The court shall have power to issue . . . every lawful writ and process necessary or suitable for the exercise of the jurisdiction given by this act. . . .”); § 8(h) (“all powers necessary or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction . . . .”) (emphasis added in both quotations). The power to issue the writ was designed by the legislature to aid in the protection of existing jurisdiction, not as an expansive addition to the statutorily-defined jurisdiction.
More importantly, this Court has limited the situations in which we will exercise our own power to issue writs of prohibition. There must be an absence of other appellate remedies and the existence of extreme necessity before the writ will issue. West Penn Power Company v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551 , 333 A.2d 909 (1975); Petition of Arlen Specter, 455 Pa. 518 , 317 A.2d 286 (1974). “It will never be granted where there is a complete and effective remedy by appeal, certiorari, writ of error, injunction or otherwise.” Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102 , 61 A.2d 426, 430 (1948). Our self-imposed restrictions are equally as appropriate for governance of the Commonwealth Court’s power to issue the writ.
I do not find any “extreme necessity” in this case which compels the issuance of a writ of prohibition. Nor can I perceive of any reason why the merits of the case — whether the Environmental Hearing Board had the power to order reargument — could not have been *216 handled on appeal. In fact, on January 30, 1974, the appellant filed in this Court a petition for a writ of prohibition which was substantially similar to the petition which was denied by the Commonwealth Court. We denied the petition to this Court per curiam and without opinion on March 8, 1974, effectively settling the question of whether the issuance of the writ was appropriate.
I do not believe that a writ of prohibition should have issued from this Court or from the Commonwealth Court in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, I would hold that the Commonwealth Court made the right disposition of the appellant’s petition to it, albeit for the wrong reason. A correct result should be sustained if it can be sustained for any reason whatsoever. Turnway v. Soffer, 461 Pa. 447 , 336 A.2d 871 (1975); Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110 , 117 A.2d 899 (1955). I would vote to affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.
EAGEN and O’BRIEN, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.