holding the Trial Court properly admitted the appellant’s prior conviction for first degree sexual abuse of an unidentified child when the victim in the case was entrusted to the appellant for babysitting care
How later courts described this case
- holding the Trial Court properly admitted the appellant’s prior conviction for first degree sexual abuse of an unidentified child when the victim in the case was entrusted to the appellant for babysitting care
- separate conviction for sexually abusing a child was admissible to prove motive, plan or intent of defendant
- supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. While I join the majority
court, I also register my disagreement with the majority court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990), that is the source of the residual hearsay issue with which our court is confronted in this issue. 1 In a sharply divided decision (5-4), the Court held Idaho’s residual hearsay exception rule to be unconstitutional, because for confrontation purposes, the residual hearsay rule was not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. The majority stated that hearsay evidence used to convict an accused must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness and not by reference to corroborating evidence at trial.
The dissenting justices in Wright took the majority court to task, stating their views that no constitutional justification existed to support the majority’s decision to remove corroborating evidence from consideration of the question whether a child’s statements are reliable. The dissent pointed out the obvious — it is a matter of common sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence. To illustrate, the dissenting justices alluded to the child abuse case as an example, stating that, if part of the child’s hearsay statement is that the assailant tied her wrists or had a scar on his abdomen, there is physical evidence or testimony to corroborate the child’s statement. In other words, such physical evidence would show the child likely did not fabricate the abuse allegations, therefore making the child’s story more worthy of belief. The dissenting opinion further sets out legal authority and commentary that, in my view, destroys the rationale employed by the majority court in its decision to strike down the corroborating residual hearsay rule — a rule which is identical to Arkansas’s rule at issue in this case.
Little else can be gained by a further discussion of the Wright decision and the dissenting justices’ views except to say that I respectfully hope the Supreme Court quickly reexamines that holding and mercifully overrules it.
Hays and Corbin, JJ., join this concurrence. Since the Wright decision, one member comprising the majority court has resigned and his vacancy has since been filled with a new appointment.