stating that a “party’s own statements are not hearsay and they are admissible on the logic that a party is estopped from challenging the fundamental reliability or trustworthiness of his own statements”
How later courts described this case
- stating that a “party’s own statements are not hearsay and they are admissible on the logic that a party is estopped from challenging the fundamental reliability or trustworthiness of his own statements”
- holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review, the complaint on appeal must at least minimally comport with the complaint at trial
- stating that future dangerousness can be' inferred from evidence showing a lack of remorse
- holding that a defendant’s own statements are not hearsay
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MEYERS, J.,
delivered this concurring opinion.
I write to register my disagreement with the majority’s observation in connection with appellant’s point of error six that “the jury could have considered as evidence of future dangerousness the fact that appellant was on parole when he committed this crime.” Majority opinion at 854. The majority says our opinion in King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), did not “specifically” place significance on such fact, but suggests it was implied. I see no such implication there:
There are several reasons that the admission of the case summaries and disciplinary reports was harmless. First, the properly admitted judgments of appellant’s prior convictions showed, chronologically, convictions for theft, theft, and burglary of a habitation. Appellant committed the burglary of a habitation while on parole from the theft charges. While theft and burglary are not the most violent of crimes, going from theft to burglary of a habitation shows an escalating pattern of disrespect for the law from which a jury could draw an inference of future dangerousness ....
King, 953 S.W.2d at 271 .
Apart from the fact that the majority’s comment has no basis in law, neither do I see a basis in logic. How is the fact that a defendant is serving parole at the time he commits another offense evidence of future .dangerousness? 1 Certainly, evidence of the prior offense for which the defendant is on parole is probative of future dangerousness. But why is the fact that the defendant is serving community supervision while committing another crime more probative of future dangerousness than if the defendant serves out his term and then commits another crime? Why is it worse for a parolee to commit a crime than it is for a former felon to commit a crime? Of course a parolee is not supposed to commit crimes while on parole. But neither is anyone supposed to commit crimes. I just don’t get it. At any rate, the majority does not explain its “finding” that a jury could consider such evidence as probative of future dangerousness.
With these remarks, I concur in the judgment.
. While I would not presume to know anything about the standards utilized by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the fact a defendant was granted a parole is arguably evidence that at least the Board of Pardons and Paroles was somewhat comfortable the defendant was not a danger to society at that time.