stating that “[a]lthough we have held that subsequent enactments by the Legislature may be some evidence of its intent in a prior version of the statute, we nevertheless give little weight to those subsequent enactments in interpreting the prior law.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[a]lthough we have held that subsequent enactments by the Legislature may be some evidence of its intent in a prior version of the statute, we nevertheless give little weight to those subsequent enactments in interpreting the prior law.”
- concluding that manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes when they involve the same victim
- finding that “a decisive majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held that a trial court cannot impose multiple convictions and sentences for variations of murder when only one person was killed.”
- holding that because the ultimate question is legislative intent, “the Blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the [L]egislature clearly intended only one”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting opinion delivered by
MEYERS, J.,
joined by MANSFIELD and JOHNSON, JJ.
The majority correctly holds the two offenses for which applicant was convicted are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes. I join this holding as well as the reasoning in support of it.
But the majority’s remedy of vacating the manslaughter conviction while retaining the intoxication manslaughter conviction does not redress the fact that the double jeopardy violation was an integral part of a plea bargain. Applicant plead guilty to both offenses in exchange for two twenty-five year sentences. Since the two offenses are the “same”, as explained in the majority’s opinion, applicant’s plea to both led to a double jeopardy violation, rendering the plea bargain unenforceable. When a provision of a plea bargain becomes unenforceable, the plea is considered involuntary. Ex parte Austin, 746 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Shannon v. State, 708 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ex Parte Huerta, 692 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Reyna, 707 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The appropriate remedy in these circumstances is withdrawal of the plea and return of the parties to their respective positions prior to the plea. *818 Heath v. State, 817 S.W.2d 335 , 337 & 340 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Shannon, supra. These authorities have not been overruled. 1
The judgment and sentence of the trial court in each cause should be set aside and applicant ordered released to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County. I dissent to the majority’s direction to the trial court to vacate the manslaughter conviction and retain the manslaughter intoxication conviction.
. Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(op. on reh'g), relied on by the majority, does not apply here. The applicant in that case was specifically found to have affirmatively accepted, as part of his plea bargain, the relinquishment of a statutory provision or right. No such acceptance is shown here. Moreover, in McJunkins, both parties agreed upon the remedy. Here, while it is clear that the State would accept the remedy granted by the majority, it is far from cleár that the pro se applicant would find such remedy acceptable.