holding failure to hold any meetings with defendant before trial was ineffective assistance of counsel
How later courts described this case
- holding failure to hold any meetings with defendant before trial was ineffective assistance of counsel
- "Without such a [in person] meeting, there is little to no hope that the client will develop a fundamental base of communication with his attorney, such that the client will freely share important information and work comfortably with the lawyer in developing a defense plan. Moreover, only a face-to-face meeting allows an attorney to assess the client's demeanor, credibility, and the overall impression he might have on a jury."
- “Indeed, the very nature of a capital case, typically quite involved and always subjecting the defendant to the possibility of death, clearly necessitates at least one in-person meeting between a lawyer and his client before trial begins.”
- indicating trial counsel “never once met with [the defendant] in person before his trial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236 (2013)
Moreover, the Commonwealth contends, even if we decline to view the holding in Brooks as a departure from prior law, it is distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN
concurring.
I agree counsel’s failure to meet with appellant prior to his murder trial comprises ineffectiveness, but make this conclu *348 sion under the traditional and long-standing Pierce 1 test; a separate analysis is not necessary solely because this is a capital case. In all cases, capital or not, counsel is presumed effective and it is up to a defendant to prove otherwise by showing: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed , to effectuate his interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding would have been different. Pierce, at 194-95.
The majority may be read as establishing a standard in capital cases that differs from that of other cases, a distinction which is unnecessary, in my judgment. Failing to meet with a client in a capital case may be ineffective in nearly every scenario; failing to meet on a disorderly conduct charge may be more easily explained. Either situation, however, may be evaluated under Pierce. It is important that the law be consistent; the constitution does not afford some lesser right to effective counsel on those charged with non-capital crimes. The right to counsel inures to the capital defendant, the felon, and the misdemeanant alike. Stewardship of capital counsel is always the most carefully scrutinized conduct of all, and rightly so, but proper scrutiny is available under the prevailing standards of Pierce; ignoring the Pierce factors in favor of a per se rule is unnecessary. Insofar as it suggests different standards of scrutiny for capital cases, it will be only the first entry on a list of per se rules we will be asked to create, a concept that seems unwise as well as unneeded.
. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514 , 645 A.2d 189, 194-95 (1994); see also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973 (1987).