The opinion
Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Earle Industries has shown that irreparable harm was inflicted upon it.
Our law is clear that a temporary restraining order will not issue unless a party seeking the order demonstrates to the court that there is a likelihood that irreparable harm will result without the temporary order. See Smith v. American Trucking Ass’n, 300 Ark. 594 , 781 S.W.2d 3 (1989); Kreutzer v. Clark, 271 Ark. 243 , 607 S.W.2d 670 (1980); Paccar Financial Corp. v. Hummell, 270 Ark. 876 , 606 S.W.2d 384 (Ark. App. 1980). Moreover, a temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only where the complainant’s right is clear, and there is no other adequate remedy. I Joyce on Injunctions, § 9, p. 18 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1909). Harm is only considered to be irreparable “when it cannot be adequately compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law.” Kreutzer, 271 Ark. at 244 , 607 S.W.2d at 671 .
That irreparable harm was likely to afflict Earle Industries because of the 45-minute demonstration during the lunch hour on September 14, 1993, is not borne out by the record. I have no doubt that the demonstration caused the managers and some employees of Earle Industries inconvenience, frustration, and even consternation. There was some criminal activity (three persons were arrested for trespassing and a fourth for cutting a lock off a back gate) and the business operation was disrupted that day because of the activity. But the test for a temporary restraining order, as stated above, is irreparable harm that cannot be repaired or remedied by money damages or by our criminal laws. Under that test, I glean no proof of irreparable harm resulting from the demonstration or proof that irreparable harm was likely to oc.cur in the future in the absence of a temporary order.
The basis for the TRO was the Reverend Jesse Jackson’s two demonstrations at Earle Industries over a two year period: one in October 1991 and the demonstration in question on September 14, 1993. Earle Industries also pointed to the four arrests, the all-but-total blocking of its main entrance by the demonstrators for 45 minutes, and the partial impediment to traffic on U.S. Highway 64 caused by the marchers. The potential for future demonstrations was evidenced, according to Earle Industries, by a leaflet' distributed after the demonstration which stated that Reverend Jackson “declared that he will return and fight for the workers until there is a contract.” The leaflet also stated: “The only thing that Felsenthal [Earle Industries’ senior vice president] understands is brute force.” A union member in addition, told a television reporter that the law had failed another union member, and they were taking the law into their hands.
Despite the leaflet and the union member’s statement, a reading of the record makes it clear that local law enforcement agencies had this relatively brief demonstration well under control from the outset. Arrests were made and disturbances were contained. One man was dragged from U.S. Highway 64 by the Chief of Police of the Earle Police Department. Otherwise, there was no proof of physical confrontation. In short, public safety was not jeopardized. Enforcement of existing criminal statutes was sufficient to quell any disturbance. Speeches were made, and the demonstration was short lived.
This activity by the union was undoubtedly orchestrated as a media event. Admittedly, disruption to the business operations of Earle Industries did occur, but not irreparable harm, present or future. More dire circumstances must be shown to justify such a finding. A 45-minute rally during the lunch hour, even with all the attendant circumstances, simply does not qualify. Because only a modicum of evidence of likely irreparable harm to Earle Industries in the future exists and because the order addresses activities which are readily remedied under existing criminal law, there is no basis for invoking this extraordinary remedy. Furthermore, to issue a temporary injunction under these facts could well have the effect of thwarting peaceful demonstrations in the future. I would reverse the chancellor’s decision and void the order.
Newbern, J., joins.