Opinion

Commonwealth v. Copenhefer

  • 553 Pa. 285
  • 719 A.2d 242
  • 1998 Pa. LEXIS 2147
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Oct 5, 1998
Status
Published
Author
Flaherty
On the bench
Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
Cited by
142 cases

Overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 566 Pa. 40 (2001)

stating an “[a]ppellant may not assert to a jury that on the one hand he was entirely cooperative with investigators but on the other hand not place before that same jury the fact that he belatedly invoked his right to remain silent to refuse to answer the most incriminating questions put to him[ ]”

How later courts described this case

  • stating an “[a]ppellant may not assert to a jury that on the one hand he was entirely cooperative with investigators but on the other hand not place before that same jury the fact that he belatedly invoked his right to remain silent to refuse to answer the most incriminating questions put to him[ ]”
  • holding that the trial court did not err by rejecting a written life-qualifying question that was “overbroad, ambiguous, and meaningless to jurors”
  • stating that it is the petitioner’s burden to “prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution”
  • holding petitioner not entitled to relief where he failed to “set forth the name of a single person who was willing to testify on his behalf as a character witness”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 566 Pa. 40 (2001)

    719 A.2d 242, 251 (Pa. 1998) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069
    Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaAug 20, 20012 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

*324 FLAHERTY, Chief Justice,

concurring and dissenting.

Although, as the majority points out, prior to the Chambers case, references to the Bible were generally treated as oratorical flair which was cautioned against but not forbidden, each case must be considered on its facts. Here, the statement was:

And it’s a penalty, ladies and gentlemen, it’s even mentioned in the Bible, the book of Exodus, where it talks about, “and the murderer shall be put to death,” because this is the only just penalty based on the evidence in this case. It’s the only penalty that I submit is appropriate if our laws are to have any meaning.

This comment does not merely refer to the Bible; rather, it quotes the Bible as requiring the death penalty and it argues that if our law is to have any meaning, the penalty required by the Bible—death—must be imposed. Thus, in effect, the prosecutor substitutes biblical law for the law of Pennsylvania, arguing that the law of Pennsylvania has meaning only if what is viewed by many to be religious law—the book of Exodus—is applied. This, in my view, goes too far and requires a reversal of the sentencing phase of the case.

Thus, I dissent, as to the majority’s affirmance of the judgment of sentence, but I agree as to the majority’s affirmance of the conviction.

NEWMAN, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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