holding that the District of Columbia has adopted “a very narrow exception to the at-will doctrine under which a discharged at-will employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the District of Columbia has adopted “a very narrow exception to the at-will doctrine under which a discharged at-will employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law”
- holding that ―there is a very narrow exception to the at-will doctrine under which a discharged at-will employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the (continued…
- recognizing exception to at-will employment doctrine where employee is terminated by employer for refusing to violate municipal regulation
- concluding that under particular circumstances, it was not extreme and outrageous to dismiss employee for refusing to disobey law by driving truck without proper inspection sticker
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEWMAN, Senior Judge,
concurring:
It is long past the time when the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine should have been recognized by this court. See Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 881 (D.C.1981) (Ferren, J., joined by Newman, then C.J., and Kelly, J., dissenting from the denial of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc). I applaud the court for finally doing so. However, I regret that the court has chosen to adopt the most narrow possible exception (“the sole cause”) following the Supreme Court of Texas in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985). Respectfully, I note that the terse opinion of the majority in Sabine contains no discussion of the possible alternative tests, cites no authority, and relies solely on ipse dixit. There is no dearth of authority, either judicial or from commentators, pointing to a more realistic exception. See, e.g., authorities cited in Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.1981). Like the court in Smith , I would require that the employee prove “the employer’s decision was motivated in substantial part” by the employee’s refusal to break the law. Smith, supra, 653 F.2d at 1063 . See also Edwards v. Habib, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126 , 397 F.2d 687 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 , 89 S.Ct. 618 , 21 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969) (retaliatory evictions); Donohoe & Drury, Inc. v. Crowther, 108 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 2405, 2410-11 (D.C.Super.Ct. Dec. 24, 1980) (Schwelb, J.) (to prevail in an action for retaliatory eviction, the tenant need not show the landlord’s “sole purpose” was to retaliate; rather, the tenant must show that retaliation was a “significant factor” in the landlord’s decision to evict).