explaining in dicta that, obtaining deeds of trust from a client in satisfaction of attorney’s fees owed is the “type of transaction ... fraught with the potential of overreaching and conflict of interest”
How later courts described this case
- explaining in dicta that, obtaining deeds of trust from a client in satisfaction of attorney’s fees owed is the “type of transaction ... fraught with the potential of overreaching and conflict of interest”
- noting, in the course of affirming award of attorney's fees to wife under § 12-103, that husband had allegedly closed all of the couple's bank accounts, thereby denying wife the ability to use marital assets to pay her attorney's fees
- finding no abuse of discretion in chancellor’s ruling that 34.9% income gap between the parties was unconscionably disparate
- noting that contribution is required when mortgage payments are made with nonmarital funds
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALPERT, Justice,
concurring.
I agree completely with the opinion of the majority except for a portion of the analysis of the “contribution” issue. There, the majority has stated in pertinent part:
Further, since the parties were married during the time appellant made those payments, they were made from marital funds and contribution was not mandated. Prahinski v. Prahinski, 75 Md.App. 113, 141 [ 540 A.2d 833 ], cert. granted, 313 Md. 572 [ 546 A.2d 490 ] (1988). If the payments had been made out of or directly traceable to nonmarital funds, the issue would be viewed from a different posture. That was not the case. Those payments were admittedly made from marital funds.
(At 193-194.)
Notwithstanding that which we have said in Spessard v. Spessard, 64 Md. App. 83, 93 , 494 A.2d 701 (1985), Prahin *209 ski v. Prahinski, 75 Md.App. 113, 141 , 540 A.2d 833 , cert. granted, 313 Md. 572 , 546 A.2d 490 (1988), and Wassif v. Wassif, 77 Md.App. 750, 766 , 551 A.2d 935 (1989), I do not believe that the legislature intended the Marital Property Act of 1978, Fam.Law Art. §§ 8-201 to 8-213, to have any direct legal impact on the Maryland law of contribution between co-tenants. The Marital Property Act and the principles of contribution stand side-by-side, but quite separate and apart. From a functional standpoint, the differences may be of little practical effect.
Where payments are made by one spouse prior to divorce and are determined to be marital funds, the trial judge may offset that sum which is mandated by contribution principles by granting a monetary award in the amount of the contribution to the non-contributing party. Functionally, that is what happened in the instant case when the chancellor denied contribution to the appellant.
And the majority agrees, of course, that if the payments had been made out of or were directly traceable to non-marital funds, then contribution would be mandated. But even under those circumstances, the trial court, if it perceived other inequities, could offset the amount of contribution (wholly or partially) by a monetary award. In the long run, I believe that Maryland law will be better served by not mixing principles of contribution with principles arising out of the Marital Property Act.