holding under a statute similar to ours that robbery is not a continuing course of conduct offense, and distinguishing, for example, engaging in business without a license or maintaining a nuisance
How later courts described this case
- holding under a statute similar to ours that robbery is not a continuing course of conduct offense, and distinguishing, for example, engaging in business without a license or maintaining a nuisance
- holding that neither robbery nor battery is defined as- a continuing course of conduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting.
The majority chooses to ignore the clear language of the statute involved in this appeal. The pertinent parts of the statute, although interpreted by the majority, were not quoted and they read as follows:
(1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: ... .
(e) The conduct constitutes an offense defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses.
We cannot affirm the conviction of both charges of aggravated robbery, if we use our usual rule of strict construction. The statute is primarily intended to prohibit “stacking” charges, and that is what was done. Furthermore, in the Commentary to this statute, there is an example given which is exactly in point with the case before us. The accused in this case was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, and in my judgment should have only been convicted of one count of aggravated robbery. I have no argument with the majority regarding the charge of first degree battery.
I am authorized to state that Justice Byrd joins me in this dissent.