explaining that "[w]hen a parent has exposed a child to continuing harm through abuse or neglect and has been unable to remediate the danger to the child," and "the child has bonded with foster parents who have provided a nurturing and safe home," in those circumstances, "termination of parental rights likely will not do more harm than good"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that "[w]hen a parent has exposed a child to continuing harm through abuse or neglect and has been unable to remediate the danger to the child," and "the child has bonded with foster parents who have provided a nurturing and safe home," in those circumstances, "termination of parental rights likely will not do more harm than good"
- explaining that when analyzing the fourth prong, it is appropriate for the court to consider "the wishes of a child over the age of ten, who has reached a level of maturity that allows the child to form and express an intelligent opinion" while remaining "mindful that children's wishes may often not be in their own best interests"
- stating that factual findings of the trial judge are generally accorded deference given the judge's "opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand; [the judge] has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold record"
- stating that "'[l]aw guardians are obliged to make the wishes of their clients known'" (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Robert M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 70 (App. Div. 2002))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. D.P., 422 N.J. Super. 583 (2011)
In our review, we note our usual deference to the special expertise of the family court, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104, 952 A.2d 436 (2008), is inapplicable because these issues before us involve “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established faets[.
The opinion
Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
Although one would be hard-pressed to disagree with the compassionate and' lofty principles embraced by the majority, a threshold question remains unaddressed: is this matter worthy of review by this Court? Because I conclude that this case does not satisfy the standards required to justify the grant of a petition for certification, I respectfully dissent.
*115 Rule 2:12-4 lays out clearly the very high hurdle a petition for certification must vault in order to justify review by this Court:
Certification will be granted only if the appeal presents a question of general public importance which has not been but should be settled by the Supreme Court or is similar to a question presented on another appeal to the Supreme Court; if the decision under review is in conflict with any other decision of the same or a higher court or calls for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervision and in other matters if the interest of justice requires. Certification will not be allowed on final judgments of the Appellate Division except for special reasons.
[ (Emphasis supplied).]
We have explained the bases for the vacation of an earlier grant of certification in the following terms:
The judgments below reflect the application of established principles ... to an intensely factual situation, in no way implicating an unsettled question of general public importance. We also are not persuaded that the question requires invocation of our certification authority in “the interest of justice,” because the result reached below is not palpably wrong, unfair or unjust. Further, because this case does not present a conflict between the Appellate Division and any other decision of the same or a higher court, it similarly does not call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory powers.
[Bandel v. Friedrich, 122 N.J. 235, 237-38 , 584 A.2d 800 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
See also Fox v. Woodbridge Township Bd. of Educ., 98 N.J. 513, 515 , 488 A.2d 1020 (1985) (O’Hern, J., concurring) (explaining that vacation of grant of certification is proper when case “remains an essentially factual dispute hardly requiring Supreme Court review”); Mahony v. Danis, 95 N.J. 50, 51 , 469 A.2d 31 (1983) (Handler, J., concurring) (stating that, “[i]n exercising our discretionary authority to decide which eases should be certified for final adjudication by the Supreme Court, we must be governed by the standards prescribed for the discharge of this responsibility. R. 2:12-4. The application of these standards in this case reveals no substantial grounds for certification.”); In re Contract for Route 280, Section 7U Exit Project, 89 N.J. 1 , 444 A.2d 51 (1982) (order dismissing appeal, stating reasons certification was improvidently granted).
In specific, this appeal presents the tragic and heart-breaking events arising out of the termination of a mother’s parental rights. However, no matter how emotionally compelling these events may *116 be, they present little that is different from the deluge of parental rights termination cases that daily flood our docket. Thus, this case does not present “a question of general public importance!;]” it does not present a “conflict with any other decision of the same or a higher court!;]” it does not present an instance that “calls for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervision!;]” it does not present a case that should be reviewed because “the interest of justice requires!;]” and it does not present any “special reasons.” In light of the foregoing, certification of this appeal should be vacated as improvidently granted.
For reversal/vacation/remandment — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS — 5.
For dissenting — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.