holding that police officer’s engaging in a high-speed pursuit was a discretionary act because the officer must decide whether to engage in pursuit, what route to take, at what speed to proceed, whether back-up should be called for, and how closely the fleeing vehicle should be pursued
How later courts described this case
- holding that police officer’s engaging in a high-speed pursuit was a discretionary act because the officer must decide whether to engage in pursuit, what route to take, at what speed to proceed, whether back-up should be called for, and how closely the fleeing vehicle should be pursued
- holding, in police pursuit cases, an officer acts in good faith, if a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstance, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend a suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit
- holding that an injured passenger in a fleeing vehicle could maintain a suit for unreasonable chase because officers owed a duty of reasonable care
- holding that after deciding to pursue suspect, an officer's actions necessarily involve his discretion in determining elements of pursuit such as speed, route, whether to call for backup, or how closely to follow suspect's car
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ENOCH, Justice,
concurring.
When a criminal suspect makes the intentional decision to take whatever steps are necessary to avoid capture by law enforcement officers, the officers’ decision to give chase cannot be a proximate cause of injuries resulting from the reckless behavior of the suspect. It is a tragedy that Bradley Chambers was a passenger on the motorcycle driven by Scott Stiles, who intentionally chose to avoid capture by driving at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour and executing the extremely risky maneuver of exiting a highway without slowing down. ' My view, though, is that the decision of the police to give chase is no legal cause for Scott Stiles to drive recklessly, irresponsibly. See Travis v. City of Mesquite, 764 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989) rev’d, 830 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.1992). However, this issue was resolved to the contrary by this Court in Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.1992). Because it is important that the parameters of police officer liability in cases such as this be settled, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that there is a fact issue on proximate cause as dictated by Travis, but I remain with my views on the matter. 1
The court of appeals in Travis affirmed summary judgment for the officers based on lack of proximate cause and, therefore, did not reach the official immunity question. I agree with this Court’s disposition of this issue.
. As Justice Brandéis stated, "In most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 , 52 S.Ct. 443, 447 , 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The legislature may very well do more to protect police officers from personal liability for a criminal suspect's reckless acts.