The opinion
OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DOUGLAS, Judge.
Judge Brown in the original opinion correctly disposed of the case when he wrote that aggravated assault was alleged in two ways but in view of the dissent the following will be noted.
Section 22.01(a)(1), V.T.C.A. Penal Code, provides that a person commits an offense (of assault) if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, causes bodily injury to another.”
Section 22.02(a)(3), V.T.C.A. Penal Code, provides that the assault becomes aggravated if the assailant uses a deadly weapon.
The indictment alleges that appellant “did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly use a deadly weapon. .” It also alleges that appellant “. . . did then and there cause bodily injury to Gary Allen Eoff, by cutting him with said knife. . . .”
The dissent would hold that intentionally and knowingly was not alleged in connection with the use of the knife or bodily injury.
A reading of that portion of the indictment set out in the dissent is enough in itself to see that it alleges that appellant knowingly and intentionally assaulted Eoff with a deadly weapon and caused bodily injury to Eoff by cutting him with a knife. The indictment alleges that appellant
“. . . did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly use a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, that in the manner of its use and intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, and did then and there cause bodily injury to Gary Allen Eoff, by cutting him with said knife.”
A similar contention by the dissent was urged in a dissent in Clark v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 527 S.W.2d 292 (1975), and was rejected. That case held that an indictment *836 should be construed as a whole. In the present case only one sentence has to be construed.
Williams v. State, 524 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), is cited by the dissent as being squarely in point. It is not in point and is not applicable. Williams was convicted for aggravated robbery. There the indictment alleged that Williams used a deadly weapon in committing theft. For the offense to have been aggravated robbery, one of two other elements was required. The indictment did not allege either additional element. Without setting out the other elements in full, one of the following was required: (1) that the defendant caused bodily injury to another, or (2) that he threatened or placed another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Neither element of the offense of aggravated robbery was alleged and for that reason the conviction was reversed.
The appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.