Defendant was arrested when taken from inside the courthouse to a room in the Sheriff’s office at the same courthouse, and questioned for three hours. Defendant was under arrest either when first taken to the room or “shortly thereafter”
How later courts described this case
- Defendant was arrested when taken from inside the courthouse to a room in the Sheriff’s office at the same courthouse, and questioned for three hours. Defendant was under arrest either when first taken to the room or “shortly thereafter”
- defendant was arrested when taken from inside the courthouse to a room in Sheriff's office at the same courthouse, and subsequently questioned for three hours
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Sullivan v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698 (1978)
State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (disposing of motion to suppress ground on basis of appellant’s lack of standing despite failure of State to raise standing at trial or on appeal); Sullivan v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (op. on reh’g) (overruling Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1975), which had held State must raise issue of standing at trial to argue it on appeal, a…
Overruled in part by Hernandez v. State, 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (1988)
Insofar as Maldonado is in conflict with the holding today, it is overruled.
Overruled in part by Wilson v. State, 1984 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (1984)
Having thus examined Sullivan in light of the afore-discussed federal cases, we find that Maldonado should only be overruled to the extent that it is in conflict with Steagald.
Overruled by Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982)
and Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982), overruled Gauldin and Maldonado and remanded this case to us.
The opinion
MORRISON, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the reversal of this conviction, but not entirely upon the reasoning of my Brother Odom. As I see it, the probable cause to search the truck ended at noon. Up until that time the officers were seeking to determine if the truck was stolen, and they had ample probable cause to pursue their search to that point. However, they were never able to establish that the truck was stolen.
When the officers branched off on a new and independent narcotics investigation *242 with no more information than they had, their original probable cause came to an end and any search thereafter was illegal. It is important to note that up until noon of the day of appellant’s arrest the motor vehicle theft investigator had found nothing about the appellant or about the truck to alert him in any way to the probability that the truck was being used for narcotics.
Shortly after noon the motor theft investigator went to San Antonio and returned with a Texas Ranger and a narcotics investigator and the search was reinstituted. This was done upon the scant information, from someone the motor theft investigator did not know, “that trucks in the past of this type had been used to transport narcotics”.
The officers’ original probable cause will not carry over to this second search. It is obvious that we do not have in the case at bar “the same continuity of purpose” discussed in our opinion on rehearing in Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 421 S.W.2d 403, 408 .