explaining that the *521 weight of the evidence presented, and not the ability to “count” any particular mitigator, is the dispositive factor in the death penalty statute’s qualitative approach to the selection in capital sentencing
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the *521 weight of the evidence presented, and not the ability to “count” any particular mitigator, is the dispositive factor in the death penalty statute’s qualitative approach to the selection in capital sentencing
- explaining that the weight of the evidence presented, and not the ability to "count" any particular mitigator, is the dispositive factor in the death penalty statute's qualitative approach to the selection in capital sentencing
- noting that a motion for a new trial arguing the verdict was against the weight of the evidence invokes the discretion of the trial court, and “Appellate review, therefore, is a review of the exercise of discretion, not the underlying question whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”
- requiring that a weight of the evidence claim be presented to the trial court in the first instance, and clarifying that appellate review of a weight of the evidence claim is limited to review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in deciding the claim presented to it
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I join in the majority’s opinion. However, I write separately because of the majority’s characterization of certain testimony complained of by Appellant as being an exception to the hearsay rule. This testimony was incorrectly characterized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This testimony was not hearsay.
Witness Charlena Hudgins testified that the victim told her that Appellant had torn up the house and that the victim left *441 the house as a result. The majority correctly states that “[t]he victim’s out-of-court statement about [Appellant]’s violence was thus not admitted for the truth of the statement but because of its effect on the witness.... ” Op. at 422. The majority goes on to state that “[a]s the out-of-court statement was not admitted for its truth, it was admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay.” Id. (citation omitted). Where an out-of-court statement is not admitted to prove the truth of what was said, the hearsay rule does not apply to that statement. Commonwealth v. Fultz, 478 Pa. 207, 212-13 , 386 A.2d 513, 515 (1978) (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 455 Pa. 480, 485 , 317 A.2d 271, 273 (1974)); see also 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1766 (Chadbourn rev.1976). As Ms. Hudgins’ testimony regarding the victim’s out-of-court statement that he left his home because of Appellant’s behavior was not offered for its truth but for the effect it had on Ms. Hudgins, it is not an exception to the hearsay rule; rather, it is not hearsay.